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GOVERNMENT LAWYER AS CAUSE LAWYER: A STUDY OF
THREE HIGH PROFILE GOVERNMENT LAWSUITS
STEVEN K. BERENSONt
INTRODUCTION
Since at least the early part of the twentieth century, lawyers have
attempted to use the law, litigation, and courts as tools to effectuate so-
cial change. The best-known early examples are the campaigns by the
NAACP to end segregated schools and the ACLU for women's and re-
productive rights. By the 1960s and 1970s, politically left-of-center law-
yers were engaged with a wide range of community-based and other or-
ganizations, using both familiar and new tactics in an effort to extend the
social change-through-law efforts of their predecessors. And, by the late
1980s and 1990s, activist lawyers situated politically on the right began
to engage in similar activities, often mimicking overtly the tactics of their
predecessors on the left. The result, at present, is an extremely broad and
deep array of lawyers who use an equally vast array of approaches and
tactics to achieve social and political goals across the ideological spec-
trum.
About a decade ago, legal sociologists Austin Sarat and Stuart
Scheingold gave name to this broad group of lawyers who seek to use
legal means in order to achieve social change. In a series of collections
now numbering five, Sarat and Scheingold have demonstrated the im-
pressive range of the work of what they refer to as "cause lawyers."' In
keeping with that diversity, the editors, along with those who have con-
tributed to their project, have avoided a rigid and all-purpose definition
of "cause lawyering." Nonetheless, at least one observation can be made
after briefly surveying the range of contributions to the cause lawyering
t Associate Professor of Law, Thomas Jefferson School of Law. The author wishes to
thank Eduardo Capulong, Elizabeth Cooper, Kate Kruse, Mary Helen McNeal, Eric Mitnick, Barry
Moon, Ascanio Piomelli, Raja Raghunath, and Tim Tarvin,for helpful comments regarding an earlier
draft, as well as Deanna Sampson for continuing support.
1. CAUSE LAWYERING AND THE STATE IN A GLOBAL ERA (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold
eds., 2001) [hereinafter Sarat & Scheingold, GLOBAL ERA]; CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL
COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds.,
1998) [hereinafter Sarat & Scheingold, CAUSE LAWYERING]; CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL
MOVEMENTS (Austin Sarat & Stuart A. Scheingold eds., 2006) [hereinafter Sarat & Scheingold,
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS]; THE CULTURAL LIVES OF CAUSE LAWYERS (Austin Sarat & Stuart Schein-
gold eds., 2008) [hereinafter Sarat & Scheingold, CULTURAL LIVES]; THE WORLDS CAUSE
LAWYERS MAKE: STRUCTURE AND AGENCY IN LEGAL PRACTICE (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold
eds., 2005) [hereinafter Sarat & Scheingold, STRUCTURE AND AGENCY]. The editors also offered
their own mid-stream assessment of the cause lawyering project in STUART A. SCHEINGOLD &
AUSTIN SARAT, SOMETHING TO BELIEVE IN: POLITICS, PROFESSIONALISM, AND CAUSE LAWYERING
(2004) [hereinafter SCIEINGOLD & SARAT, SOMETHING TO BELIEVE].
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series. While a small number of the contributions in the series focus on
the work of government lawyers, these all involve the work of lawyers in
"emerging democracies," or regimes in which the rule of law is not well
established.2 Indeed, none of the contributions to the series which focus
on the work of lawyers in western democracies, where the rule of law is
well established, focus directly on the role of government lawyers.3
Thus, one of the two major questions addressed by this paper is whether
it may be appropriate, in some circumstances, to treat government law-
yers in regimes where the rule of law is well established, such as the
United States, as cause lawyers.
At first blush, it would appear that the answer to this question
should be no. After all, in some of their roles, government lawyers
would appear to be the antithesis of cause lawyers. When they defend
government officials and agencies charged with wrongdoing, or defend
existing statutes and regulations against legal challenges, government
lawyers would appear to be the ultimate defenders of the status quo. And
government lawyers certainly lack the "outsider" status that appears to be
a hallmark of many cause lawyers.
On the other hand, in other contexts, certain government lawyers do
appear to invoke the law, litigation, and courts to achieve social change.
First, where the government itself or its entities are engaged in pursuing
a progressive social change agenda, government lawyers' defense of that
agenda looks similar to the work of non-governmental cause lawyers
who represent and defend activists who pursue social change outside of
the government.4 Additionally, government lawyers may invoke their
public authority to initiate their own legal campaigns designed to alter
some aspect of the social, economic, or political status quo. Indeed, in
doing so, the work of these latter government lawyers often bears more
than a faint resemblance to the work of the first generation of cause law-
yers identified above. Thus, a closer look at the work of government
lawyers who overtly use the law and their government positions to
achieve social change is warranted.
The method used to achieve this goal will be familiar to those ac-
quainted with the cause lawyering series: the case study. More particu-
larly, Part I of this paper will begin with relatively detailed descriptions
of three legal actions initiated by government lawyers which appear to
2. See, e.g., Yoav Dotan, The Global Language of Human Rights: Patterns of Cooperation
Between State and Civil Rights Lawyers in Israel, in Sarat & Scheingold, GLOBAL ERA, supra note
1, at 246 (discussing cooperation between Israeli civil rights lawyers and lawyers within Israel's
Attorney General's office in an effort to protect the civil rights of Palestinians in the Occupied
Territories); Lucie White, Two Worlds of Ghanaian Cause Lawyers, in Sarat & Scheingold, GLOBAL
ERA, supra note 1, at 35 (discussing elite lawyers who work within government agencies on matters
of economic development policies in an effort to raise Ghanaian standards of living).
3. See Thomas M. Hilbink, You Know the Type... : Categories of Cause Lawyering, 29
LAW & Soc. INQUtRy 657, 661 n.5 (2004) [hereinafter Hilbink, Categories] (noting the absence).
4. Thanks to my colleague Eric Mitnick for pointing this out to me.
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have fairly transparent social change objectives. 5  The first case de-
scribed will be Mississippi Attorney General Mike Moore's lawsuit
against the tobacco industry.6 The second case described will be the City
of Chicago's lawsuit against the gun industry. And the third case de-
scribed will be then New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer's legal
action against financial services firm Merrill Lynch, relating to conflicts
of interest regarding research analyst information provided by the com-
pany. 8
Once these cases are presented, an effort will be made to situate
these legal actions within the cause lawyering literature.9 First, a general
comparison between government lawyers and certain cause lawyers will
be drawn.10 Next, the paper will rely on political science Professor
Thomas Hilbink's typology of cause lawyering, I I as well as Sarat and
Scheingold's own typology, offered in their mid-series synopsis regard-
ing the cause lawyering project,' 2 to further compare the government
lawyers studied here and cause lawyers more generally. After conduct-
ing these comparisons, the conclusion will be reached that despite dis-
tinctions with paradigmatic cause lawyering efforts, the three govern-
ment legal actions presented here may appropriately be considered a
form of what Hilbink describes as "elite/vanguard" cause lawyering.
13
This conclusion, however, raises a second major question for this
paper to address. Even assuming that government lawyers, in some cir-
cumstances, may appropriately be categorized as cause lawyers, the
question arises as to how effective they may be acting in that role. In a
similarly broad and deep literature that overlaps with the cause lawyering
project, commentators have questioned the effectiveness of cause law-
yers generally in achieving their social change objectives. Perhaps the
best-known work to raise this argument is Professor Gerald Rosenberg's
The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Achieve Social Change ?14 In this vo-
lume, Rosenberg relies on large amounts of data to contend that some of
the best known elite/vanguard cause lawyering campaigns, including
5. See infra Part I.A.
6. See infra Part I.A. 1.
7. See infra Part I.A.2.
8. See infra Part I.A.3.
9. See infra Part I.B.
10. See infra Part I.B. 1.
11. See infra Part I.B.2; Hilbink, Categories, supra note 3, at 661.
12. See infra Part I.B.3; SCHEINGOLD & SARAT, SOMETHING TO BELIEVE, supra note 1, at 98,
101,107.
13. See infra Part I.C; Hilbink, Categories, supra note 3, at 673.
14. GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL
CHANGE? (1st ed. 1991) [hereinafter ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE]. A second edition of the
book was recently published. GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING
ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (2nd ed. 2008) [hereinafter ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE 2]. The
second edition differs from the first only in adding two new chapters dealing with the legal campaign
to achieve same-sex marriage rights. See id. at xi. For that reason, references throughout the re-
mainder of this paper will be to the first edition, unless otherwise stated.
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some of those identified at the outset of this paper, failed to achieve their
objectives.
By contrast, a number of other writers, including Sarat, 15 Schein-
gold,16 and most frequently, University of Washington political science
Professor Michael McCann,17 have challenged Rosenberg's conclusions.
They suggest that the aggregate and quantitative approach taken by Ro-
senberg fails to capture the entirety of the ways in which social change
can come about through law, and suggest an alternative "cultural ap-
proach" in order to recognize what are often subtle and nuanced changes
that can result from legal action.
In Part II, this paper will rely primarily on the work of Rosenberg
and McCann to evaluate the effectiveness of the three government litiga-
tion actions described in the previous Part. After describing the work of
these authors generally, 8 the three cases that are the focus here will be
analyzed through the frames offered by these authors.' 9 The primary
question will be whether some of the factors that cause government law-
yers to fit uneasily within the category of cause lawyers, might nonethe-
less allow such lawyers to transcend some of the limits described by Ro-
senberg and others on the effectiveness of cause lawyers in achieving
their social change objectives. 20 The conclusion will be that while gov-
ernment lawyers may enjoy some advantages in achieving their social
change objectives that other cause lawyers do not, nonetheless, such
lawyers still face significant limitations in their ability to achieve broad
social change objectives through litigation.21
By demonstrating that it is appropriate in some circumstances to
think of government lawyers as cause lawyers, it is hoped that some so-
cial change oriented lawyers will be convinced to pursue their objectives
through government service. On the other hand, the final part of this
paper provides a caution to such lawyers that government service will
not absolve them of making the difficult strategic judgments required of
all successful cause lawyers.
15. See, e.g., Austin Sarat & Jonathan Simon, Beyond Legal Realism?: Cultural Analysis,
Cultural Studies, and the Situation of Legal Scholarship, 13 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. (SPECIAL ISSUE)
3, 7, 11 & n.39 (2001).
16. See, e.g., Stuart A. Scheingold, Essay for the In-Print Symposium on the Myth of Moral
Justice, 4 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 47, 47 (2006) (reviewing THANE ROSENBAUM, THE
MYTH OF MORAL JUSTICE: WHY OUR SYSTEM FAILS TO Do WHAT'S RIGHT (2004)).
17. Michael W. McCann, Reform Litigation on Trial, 17 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 715, 716
(1992) [hereinafter McCann, Reform Litigation] (reviewing ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE, supra
note 14); Michael W. McCann, Causal Versus Constitutive Explanations (or, on the Difficulty of
Being So Positive... ), 21 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 457, 477-78 (1996); see Michael W. McCann, Law
and Political Struggles for Social Change: Puzzles, Paradoxes, and Promises in Future Research,
in LEVERAGING THE LAW: USING COURTS TO ACHIEVE SOCIAL CHANGE 319, 328-29 (David A.
Schultz ed., 1998).
18. See infra Part l.A.1-2.
19. See infra Part ll.B.
20. See infra Part II.C.
21. See infra CONCLUSION.
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I. CAN GOVERNMENT LAWYERS BE CAUSE LAWYERS?
This Part of the paper begins by offering descriptions of three high-
profile government litigation campaigns which arguably fall within the
category of cause lawyering. Next, it compares government lawyering to
cause lawyering more generally, and then analyzes the three cases under
discussion in conjunction with the typologies of cause lawyering offered
by scholars Thomas Hilbink, and Austin Sarat, and Stuart Scheingold. It
ends by concluding that the three cases in question offer examples of
government cause lawyering.
A. The Cases
This section of the paper offers presentations of three high-profile
government legal campaigns, each of which appears to have been moti-
vated by social change objectives. The cases presented are Mississippi
Attorney General Mike Moore's lawsuit against the tobacco industry, the
City of Chicago's lawsuit against the gun industry, and New York Attor-
ney General Eliot Spitzer's actions against financial services firm Merrill
Lynch, regarding conflicts of interest in the provision of research analyst
information.
1. Michael Moore v. American Tobacco Company
On May 23, 1994, Mississippi Attorney General Mike Moore filed
what became the first of many lawsuits by states against the tobacco in-
22dustry. For Moore, the lawsuit was clearly about social change. To
him, the tobacco industry was to blame for a public health crisis caused
by cigarette smoking. 23 Yet to date, the industry had gotten a free ride-
avoiding all responsibility for the harm it had caused.24  Moore also
viewed the situation in personal terms. He was offended by what he saw
as efforts by the tobacco companies to attract young children, like his
own, to become smokers.25 However, Moore was not interested in a
high-profile public relations campaign against the industry, a new push
for increased regulation, or other effort that might cause the industry to
26change its practices. 6 Rather, Moore turned to litigation and the courts
22. See CARRICK MOLLENKAMP, ADAM LEVY, JOSEPH MENN & JEFFREY ROTHFEDER, THE
PEOPLE VS. BIG TOBACCO: HOW THE STATES TOOK ON THE CIGARETTE GIANTS 30 (spec. ed. 2006)
[hereinafter MOLLENKAMP, THE PEOPLE]; DAN ZEGART, CIVIL WARRIORS: THE LEGAL SIEGE ON
THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY 141 (2000) [hereinafter ZEGART, CIVIL WARRIORS]; Complaint, Moore v.
Am. Tobacco Co., No. 94-1429 (Jackson County Ch. Ct. May 23, 1994), available at
http://www.library.ucsf.edu/tobacco/litigation/ms/2moore.html (last visited Dec. 22, 2008).
23. See MOLLENKAMP, THE PEOPLE, supra note 22, at 30.
24. See id.
25. See ZEGART, CIVIL WARRIORS, supra note 22, at 140.
26. See id. at 141.
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to force the tobacco companies to accept responsibility for their prior
conduct and change their practices.2 7
Of course by this time, the tobacco industry was far from being new
to litigation. For decades, individual and groups of smokers had sued
tobacco companies on a variety of theories.28 Such theories included
negligence, breach of express and implied warranties, deceit, failure to
warn, and strict liability.29 However, prior to the filing of the Mississippi
suit, no plaintiff was successful in having a jury verdict sustained against
a tobacco company.30 Early on, plaintiffs had difficulty proving a causal
link between cigarette smoking and disease. 3t Later, cigarette companies
contended that they could not reasonably have foreseen the harm that
could be caused by cigarettes.32 Though the Surgeon General's 1964
report linking cigarette smoking and cancer would greatly diminish these
defenses,33 the 1965 Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act,
34
which among other provisions, compelled placement of the well-known
warning label on cigarette packages and advertisements,35 preempted
most failure-to-warn claims. 36 Perhaps the most successful defense of-
fered by the cigarette manufacturers involved variations on the assump-
tion of risk doctrine-the argument that smokers chose to smoke despite
awareness of potential adverse health effects, and therefore were legally
responsible for their own illnesses.37
Aside from the legal defenses asserted by the tobacco companies,
their manner of litigating cases was perhaps an even greater impediment
27. See MOLLENKAMP, THE PEOPLE, supra note 22, at 30 (demonstrating Moore's desire to
see the tobacco companies pay what they owe); see also ZEGART, CIVIL WARRIORS, supra note 22,
at 141 (challenging the other lawyers to see the litigation through to the end).
28. See Stephen D. Sugarman, Comparing Tobacco & Gun Litigation, in SUING THE GUN
INDUSTRY 196,215 (Timothy D. Lytton ed., 2005) [hereinafter SUING THE GUN INDUSTRY].
29. See Graham E. Kelder, Jr. & Richard A. Daynard, The Role of Litigation in the Effective
Control of the Sale and Use of Tobacco, 8 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 63, 71 (1997); Bryce A. Jensen,
Note, From Tobacco to Health Care and Beyond-A Critique of Lawsuits Targeting Unpopular
Industries, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1334, 1338-40 (2001); John J. Zefutie, Jr., Comment, From Butts to
Big Macs-Can the Big Tobacco Litigation and Nation-Wide Settlement with States' Attorneys
General Serve as a Model for Attacking the Fast Food Industry?, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 1383,
1387-88 (2004).
30. See Kelder & Daynard, supra note 29, at 76; Robert L. Rabin, Essay, A Sociolegal History
of the Tobacco Tort Litigation, 44 STAN. L. REV. 853,854 & n. 11 (1992).
31. Kelder & Daynard, supra note 29, at 71; Peter Pringle, Essay, The Chronicles of Tobacco:
An Account of the Forces that Brought the Tobacco Industry to the Negotiating Table, 25 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 387,389 (1999); Zefutie, supra note 29, at 1387.
32. Jensen, supra note 29, at 1339 (discussing Lartigue v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317
F.2d 19 (5thCir. 1963)); Rabin, supra note 30, at 860-61 (discussing Lartigue, 317 F.2d 19).
33. See PUB. HEALTH SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, PUB. NO. 1103,
SMOKING AND HEALTH: REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMrrEE TO THE SURGEON GENERAL OF THE
PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE 229-32 (1964).
34. Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282
(1965).
35. Jensen, supra note 29, at 1340-41.
36. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 524 (1992); see also Jensen, supra
note 29, at 1342-43 (discussing Cipollone).
37. Kelder & Daynard, supra note 29, at 71; Zefutie, supra note 29, at 1389.
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to the ability of plaintiffs to recover from the companies. The tobacco
companies resorted to a "scorched earth" style of litigation, in which they
were able to exploit their vastly superior resources to those of the plain-
tiffs and the plaintiffs' lawyers who challenged them.38 The tobacco
lawyers filed every conceivable motion, contested every conceivable
issue, took every imaginable deposition, and demanded every arguably
relevant document.39 The result was, in many cases, simply outlasting
the plaintiffs and their lawyers. Indeed, in Cipollone v. Liggett Group,
Inc. ,40 even after the U.S. Supreme Court allowed most of the plaintiffs'
legal theories to go forward,4t plaintiffs' attorneys abandoned the case,42
nearly a decade after it had originally been filed,43 and nearly $3 million
worth of attorney and paralegal time and approximately $150,000 in out-
of-pocket expenses had been advanced by plaintiffs' attorneys.
44
Despite this history, Moore's case on behalf of Mississippi offered
the potential to sidestep the challenges that had derailed previous law-
suits against the tobacco industry. First, the Mississippi lawsuit was
based upon a novel theory of law involving a claim for reimbursement of
the State's Medicaid program for funds expended treating Mississippi
residents for smoking-related illnesses.45 Journalists attribute the devel-
opment of this theory to Mississippi personal injury lawyer Mike Lewis,
who arrived at the theory after visiting the dying mother of a friend of
his, who was suffering from cancer after a lifetime of heavy smoking.46
Lewis noted the tremendous amount of money the State of Mississippi
was paying, through its Medicaid program, to treat such smokers, who
had exhausted their personal resources in battling their illnesses.47
Though Lewis is credited with bringing the Medicaid reimbursement
theory to his law school classmate Mike Moore's attention, Southern
Illinois University law professor Donald Garner had advanced a similar
theory in an obscure law review article published more than a decade and
a half earlier.48  Regardless of its origin, the genius of the Medicaid
reimbursement theory was that it deprived the tobacco companies of their
strongest defense-namely that the party suing them had chosen to
38. See Jensen, supra note 29, at 1339; Kelder & Daynard, supra note 29, at 71; Rabin, supra
note 30, at 868.
39. See Kelder & Daynard, supra note 29, at 71.
40. 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
41. Jensen, supra note 29, at 1343.
42. Kelder & Daynard, supra note 29, at 72.
43. See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 509; Kelder & Dayard, supra note 29, at 72.
44. Kelder & Daynard, supra note 29, at 72.
45. Jensen, supra note 29, at 1344; Kelder & Daynard, supra note 29, at 73; Zefutie, supra
note 29, at 1392.
46. MOLLENKAMP, THE PEOPLE, supra note 22, at 25; Pringle, supra note 31, at 392;
ZEGART, CIVIL WARRIORS, supra note 22, at 92.
47. See MOLLENKAMP, THE PEOPLE, supra note 22, at 25; Pringle, supra note 31, at 392;
ZEGART, CIVIL WARRIORS, supra note 22, at 92.
48. Pringle, supra note 31, at 393 (discussing Donald W. Garner, Cigarettes and Welfare
Reform, 26 EMORY L.J. 269 (1977)).
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smoke despite knowing of the related health risks.49 While the individual
smoker may have made a "choice" to smoke, the State of Mississippi,
which was paying for the smoker's care, surely had not.50 Additionally,
the theory squared with Mike Moore's sense of the equities of the situa-
tion: the tobacco companies had caused the harm, but the State of Mis-
sissippi was paying the cost.
51
Secondly, though the State of Mississippi would not be able to
equal the resources the tobacco companies would bring to bear on the
lawsuit, a state party could certainly come closer to matching the indus-
try's resource advantage than the private litigants who had previously
sued the industry. Further, in order to bolster the resources available to
support Mississippi's lawsuit, Moore entered into contingent fee agree-
ments with a number of private attorneys, who in turn agreed to front
many of the out-of-pocket costs that would be needed to pursue the
case. 52 Among the lawyers who worked on the tobacco litigation with
Moore were Mississippi personal injury attorneys Don Barnett, Ron Mot-
ley, and Dickie Scruggs. 53 Each of these lawyers had been highly suc-
cessful in lawsuits involving the asbestos industry, and was anxious to
apply what he had learned from asbestos litigation to tobacco litigation.54
Moreover, their successes in the asbestos suits provided these lawyers'
firms with the resources they would need to take on big tobacco.
55
Despite potentially having neutralized tobacco's strongest defense
and its historical resource advantages, Moore nonetheless faced other
daunting challenges in pursuing the tobacco companies. For example,
the politics of a major lawsuit against the tobacco industry were complex
for an elected official such as Moore. Though Mississippi was not a ma-
jor tobacco growing state, it was a conservative southern state, and pub-
lic opinion was favorable to the tobacco companies.56 Despite Moore's
status as a rising star on the political scene, he was a Democrat in an
overwhelmingly Republican state. Indeed, the political fault lines impli-
cated by Mississippi's tobacco suit were clearly exposed when Republi-
can Governor Kirk Fordice sued Moore after the lawsuit was filed, chal-
lenging his authority to bring the suit on behalf of the State of Mississip-
49. See id. at 393-94.
50. MOLLENKAMP, THE PEOPLE, supra note 22, at 25, 29.
51. MOLLENKAMP, THE PEOPLE, supra note 22, at 30.
52. MOLLENKAMP, THE PEOPLE, supra note 22, at 28.
53. See ZEGART, CIVIL WARRIORS, supra note 22, at 88, 92-93.
54. See id. at 93; Pringle, supra note 31, at 389.
55. ZEGART, CIvIL WARRIORS, supra note 22, at 94; Pringle, supra note 31, at 389.
56. Indeed, in the fall of 1993, Dick Morris, who would later achieve notoriety as a political
advisor to President Clinton, polled potential jurors in Pascagoula, Mississippi, and found that sixty
percent supported the tobacco companies in a potential suit by the State. ZEGART, CIVIL WARRIORS,
supra note 22, at 140. As a result, the case was eventually filed in Chancery Court, where jury trials
were not available. Id.
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pi.57 In any event, it was doubtful that Moore's political star would sur-
vive a high profile, unpopular, expensive lawsuit, in the event it was un-
successful.
On the other hand, at the national level, public opinion had turned
strongly against the tobacco companies by the time Moore filed his suit.
Already, numerous municipalities had passed ordinances limiting smok-
ing in public places and placing other restrictions on tobacco use.58 In
February 1994, David Kessler, then chairman of the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration (FDA), announced that he was considering changing
decades of FDA policy and asserting the agency's jurisdiction to regulate
tobacco as a drug.59 Just a few days later, the ABC television news mag-
azine show "Day One" aired a segment charging that cigarette manufac-
turer Phillip Morris had manipulated the level of nicotine in its cigarettes
in order to make its product more addictive.6 ° In April, the House of
Representatives' Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Health and
the Environment held hearings regarding the tobacco industry. 61 During
these hearings, each of the CEOs of the world's seven largest tobacco
companies testified under oath that they did not believe that nicotine was
addictive,62 despite overwhelming scientific evidence to the contrary.63
Indeed, documents produced through tobacco litigation and by whistleb-
lowers from within the tobacco companies subsequently demonstrated
both that the companies had long been aware of nicotine's addictive
properties, and that they had taken extreme steps to obfuscate public
awareness of that fact. 64
Though Moore's suit on behalf of Mississippi was the first suit by a
state against the tobacco companies, it was far from the last. In the end,
57. In re Fordice, 691 So. 2d 429 (Miss. 1997). Fordice argued that as the executive branch
official charged with responsibility for the State's Medicaid program, only he could sue on its behalf
to recover money expended to treat tobacco-related illnesses. Id. at 430. However, the Mississippi
Supreme Court declined to exercise its jurisdiction to issue an order preventing Moore from going
forward with the tobacco case. Id. at 435.
58. Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The Costs of Cigarettes: The Economic Case for Ex-
Post Incentive-Based Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 1163, 1168 (1998); Jody Hodgdon,
Notes/Comments, Live Smoke Free or Die: The Battle for Smoke Free Restaurants in New Hamp-
shire, 3 PIERCE L. REV. 49, 51 (2004) (discussing municipal ordinances that prohibit smoking in
restaurants); Jennifer McCullough, Note, Lighting Up the Battle Against the Tobacco Industry: New
Regulations Prohibiting Cigarette Sales to Minors, 28 RUTGERS L.J. 709, 731-32 (1997) (discussing
municipal ordinances in New Jersey regulating tobacco use).
59. See ZEGART, CIVIL WARRIORS, supra note 22, at 113; Pringle, supra note 31, at 394. The
U.S. Supreme Court later ruled that the FDA lacks such authority. FDA v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 161 (2000).
60. ZEGART, CIVIL WARRIORS, supra note 22, at 116-18. Phillip Morris subsequently sued
ABC for libel as a result of the allegation. Id. at 122. ABC settled the case by issuing a public
apology to Phillip Morris for the charges. Id. at 180. However, later evidence would more than
substantiate the allegation of nicotine manipulation. Kelder & Daynard, supra note 29, at 77.
61. MOLLENKAMP, THE PEOPLE, supra note 22, at 50.
62. Id. at 50-51.
63. E.g., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF
SMOKING: NICOTINE ADDICTION, A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL (1988).
64. Kelder & Daynard, supra note 29, at 76-77; Pringle, supra note 31, at 387-88.
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a total of more than forty states brought actions against the tobacco com-
panies. 65 Additionally, around the time the Mississippi case was filed, a
new "wave" of private litigation was launched against the tobacco com-
panies. 66 Leading the charge was flamboyant New Orleans personal in-
jury lawyer Wendell Gauthier.67 Gauthier was the lead attorney in the
first nationwide class action lawsuit filed against the industry, Castano v.
American Tobacco Co. 68  Though the substantive claims raised in the
Castano case were similar to those that had been raised against tobacco
companies previously, 69 the plaintiffs' lawyers believed that the recently
uncovered documents and other evidence regarding the defendants' mal-
feasance might yield a different result.7 ° Moreover, in order to neutralize
the tobacco companies' resource advantage, Gauthier signed up sixty of
the nation's top plaintiffs' personal injury firms to participate in the case,
each of whom put up $100,000 to help finance the litigation.71 Though
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit eventually denied certifi-
cation of the nationwide class,72 the Castano lawyers would go on to file
statewide class actions in numerous states following the Fifth Circuit's
decision.73
The above-described shift in public opinion, the prospect of federal
regulation, and the wave of new lawsuits that threatened to bankrupt the
industry, achieved something never achieved before: it brought big to-
bacco to the negotiating table. 74 Mike Moore became the chief negotia-
tor on behalf of a large coalition of tobacco's foes in pursuing the possi-
bility of a "global settlement" with the industry.75 Moore was squeezed
from both sides in pursuing settlement talks. Public health advocates
such as David Kessler, anti-smoking groups, and at least one State Attor-
ney General were against settling, which they believed would let the de-
65. UNIV. OF CAL. SAN FRANCISCO, TOBACCO CONTROL ARCHIVES, LAWSUIT SUMMARY
CHART, http://www.library.ucsf.edu/tobaccollifigationsummary.html (last visited Dec. 22, 2008).
66. See Jensen, supra note 29, at 1338-43; see also Kelder & Daynard, supra note 29, at 71-
72 (identifying three "waves" of tobacco related lawsuits); Pringle, supra note 31, at 389; Zefutie,
supra note 29, at 1387-92.
67. MOLLENKAMp, THE PEOPLE, supra note 22, at 73; ZEGART, CIVIL WARRIORS, supra note
22, at 149-50.
68. 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996); see MOLLENKAMP, THE PEOPLE, supra note 22, at 73-74.
The named plaintiff was a friend of Gauthier's who had died from smoking related illness. Id. at 73.
69. See Castano, 84 F.3d at 737-38; MOLLENKAMP, THE PEOPLE, supra note 22, at 73.
70. See Pringle, supra note 31, at 388-89.
71. id. at 391.
72. See Castano, 84 F.3d at 737.
73. MOLLENKAMP, THE PEOPLE, supra note 22, at 74; ZEGART, CIVIL WARRIORS, supra note
22, at 201; Kelder & Daynard, supra note 29, at 72-73; Pringle, supra note 31, at 395; Zefutie, supra
note 29, at 1391.
74. Pringle, supra note 31, at 387-88.
75. In March 1996, Liggett Group, one of the smaller tobacco companies, broke ranks with
the rest of the industry and settled with Mississippi and four other states for approximately $26
million. MOLLENKAMP, THE PEOPLE, supra note 22, at 57. Liggett was struggling financially and
feared that judgments in the lawsuits or the terms of a global settlement would bankrupt it. Id. at 58.
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fendant tobacco companies off too easily.76 The companies, in turn,
were demanding concessions the plaintiffs were not prepared to give,
including immunity from all future lawsuits, whether by public or private
parties.77
Eventually, after nearly a year of intense, behind-the-scenes negoti-
ations, and merely weeks before the Mississippi case was scheduled to
go to trial,78 Moore announced that a settlement had been reached with
the tobacco companies (hereinafter, Master Settlement Agreement or
MSA).79 The settlement called for a payment by the tobacco companies
of the staggering sum of $386.5 billion in order to settle all existing to-
bacco litigation.80  In addition to the cash payment, the settlement re-
quired numerous changes to the way the tobacco companies did business.
Among the changes to be required were the following: banning all out-
door advertising including billboards; limiting magazine ads to black-
and-white text in periodicals with no more than fifteen percent youth
readership; prohibiting distribution of tobacco through vending machines
and free samples; forbidding brand-name sponsorship of cultural and
sporting events; prohibiting the industry from paying to place its prod-
ucts in movies or to be named in pop songs; empowering the FDA to
regulate the manufacture and sale of tobacco products; and penalizing the
industry further if teen smoking rates did not decline to meet specific
targets.81 In exchange for these concessions, in addition to settling exist-
ing lawsuits, the industry was to receive an elimination of class-action
tobacco lawsuits, a ban on punitive damages awarded based on past ac-
tions by the tobacco companies, and a limit on the total amount of dam-
ages the industry could be liable for in future lawsuits by smokers to $5
billion annually.82
76. MOLLENKAMP, THE PEOPLE, supra note 22, at 72; ZEGART, CIVIL WARRIORS, supra note
22, at 271-72. Minnesota Attorney General Hubert "Skip" Humphrey, H was the most vociferous
opponent of settlement within the AG camp. See MOLLENKAMP, THE PEOPLE, supra note 22 at 72;
ZEGART, CIVIL WARRIORS, supra note 22, at 272. However, Humphrey eventually settled his
State's suit against tobacco as well, though four months into trial. ZEGART, CIVIL WARRIORS, supra
note 22, at 321.
77. MOLLENKAMP, THE PEOPLE, supra note 22, at 105.
78. On the same day the Mississippi Supreme Court denied Governor Fordice's challenge to
the Mississippi suit, the court rejected a similar challenge by the tobacco company defendants to
Moore's authority to pursue the Medicaid reimbursement suit in chancery court. See In re Fordice,
691 So. 2d 429, 235 (Miss. 1997); In re Corr-Williams Tobacco Co., 691 So. 2d 424, 425-26 (Miss.
1997).
79. MOLLENKAMP, THE PEOPLE, supra note 22, at 230-31; ZEGART, CIVIL WARRIORS, supra
note 22, at 270. Actually, by the time the Master Settlement Agreement was reached, four states,
Florida, Mississippi, Texas, and Minnesota, had reached separate settlements with the tobacco com-
panies. See Steven A. Schroeder, Tobacco Control in the Wake of the 1998 Master Settlement
Agreement, 350 NEW ENG. J. MED. 293, 294 (2004).
80. MOLLENKAMP, THE PEOPLE, supra note 22, at 236. This amount was to be paid out over
a twenty-five-year period. See Zefutie, supra note 29, at 1397.
81. MOLLENKAMP, THE PEOPLE, supra note 22, at 236-37.
82. Id. at 237. A complete copy of the MSA appears in id. at 267-317.
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However, because federal law governed many of the areas that were
addressed by the Master Settlement Agreement, Congressional approval
would be required in order to implement the terms of the settlement.
Though Senator John McCain sponsored legislation to implement the
MSA, the legislation never made it through Congress, due to "lukewarm
support by the Clinton administration, ambivalence on the part of the
public health community, and vigorous opposition from the tobacco in-
dustry .... ,8 Eventually, in November 1998, the Attorneys General of
the forty-six states that hadn't yet settled entered into a revised MSA
with the tobacco companies. 84 The revised MSA avoided subjects that
would require federal legislation, thereby sidestepping the issue of Con-
gressional approval (such as FDA regulation of tobacco, advertising re-
strictions, etc.). The settlement provided for a sharply reduced payment
of $206 billion to be paid to the states over twenty-five years. 8 It also
provided for the dissolution of certain industry promoting entities such as
the Tobacco Institute, and prohibited advertising targeted at young
people (such as the infamous "Joe Camel" ads).86
2. Chicago v. Beretta, U.S.A
By 1998, after the tobacco MSA had been entered into, Wendell
Gauthier and his colleagues who had collaborated on the Castano na-
tionwide class action, the numerous mini-Castano suits filed in state
courts following the Fifth Circuit's denial of certification of the nation-
wide class, and who had also played prominent roles as co-counsel in
many of the Medicaid reimbursement suits brought by states, were look-
ing for a new focus for their efforts.87 The gun industry was a logical
choice, as many of the theories pled in the Castano tobacco cases might
be said to apply equally to the gun industry. 88 Though only about half of
the firms who signed on for the tobacco litigation agreed to join the ef-
fort against the gun industry, 89 and at a considerably smaller financial
stake than was put up in the prior effort,90 Gauthier was nonetheless able
to attract an impressive array of plaintiffs' firms to join the "Castano
Safe Gun Litigation Group.
9 1




87. See HOwARD M. ERICHSON, Private Lawyers, Public Lawsuits: Plaintiffs' Attorneys in
Municipal Gun Litigation, in SUING THE GUN INDUSTRY, supra note 28, 129, at 129-30, 136.
88. See id. at 136.
89. Id.
90. Unlike the $100,000 bounty each firm was required to post to take on the tobacco compa-
nies, Bob Van Voris, Gun Cases Use Tobacco Know-How: New Orleans, Chicago Lead the Charge.
Is Alcohol Next?, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 7, 1998, at Al, the gun litigation only required a pledge of
$50,000, with an initial cash outlay of $2,500, ERICHSON, supra note 87, at 136.
91. ERICHSON, supra note 87, at 129-30.
468 [Vol. 86:2
GOVERNMENT LAWYER AS CA USE LA WYER
The group wasted little time in filing suit against fifteen gun manu-
facturers on behalf of Gauthier's home city of New Orleans on Hallo-
ween 1998.92 Eventually, members of the group would also file suits
against the gun industry on behalf of the cities of Atlanta, Cleveland,
Cincinnati, Newark, and Wilmington.93 Nonetheless, the focus of the
following discussion will not be on any of these cases, but rather on a
different lawsuit brought against the gun industry by the City of Chicago
and Cook County, Illinois. Unlike the cases brought on behalf of the
cities mentioned above, the bulk of the work performed on the lawsuit
brought on behalf of the City of Chicago was performed by lawyers
within the City Attorney's office, rather than by outside attorneys work-
ing pursuant to contingent fee agreements with the various cities.94 Thus,
the Chicago case may present a "purer" example of government lawyers
engaged in arguably social-change oriented litigation. Additionally, and
perhaps because of the nature of the lawyers involved, the Chicago suit
was based expressly on a legal theory that was only available to the
plaintiffs by virtue of their status as public entities-namely, public nuis-
ance.95 By contrast, even when litigating on behalf of municipalities, the
Castano lawyers nonetheless focused on the same product liability theo-
ries that they had focused on in the tobacco cases and had relied on for
years in bringing cases on behalf of private parties.
96
Of course, increases in gun violence had been a major concern for
urban municipalities such as Chicago in the decade leading up to the
lawsuits filed against the gun industry. 97 Indeed, Chicago had been par-
ticularly hard hit by the combination of gangs and guns. 98 In the year
prior to the filing of its gun lawsuit, Chicago led the nation with 570 gun
homicides.99 This was despite the fact that Chicago had a significantly
smaller population than other major cities.10° As a result, Chicago's
gruff Mayor Richard M. Daley decided that the City needed to pursue
92. Id. at 137.
93. Id. at 129.
94. See id. at 134.
95. See id. at 132.
96. See id. at 137.
97. More specifically, there was a dramatic increase in homicides in large cities between the
years 1985 and 1993. See, e.g., JAMES ALAN Fox & MARIANNE W. ZAWrrz, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
HOMICIDE TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/htius.pdf (last
visited Dec. 22, 2008). Such deaths subsequently dropped significantly between 1993 and 2000,
leveling off after that. Id. Most of the deaths recorded during the 1985-1993 "spike" were attributa-
ble to handgun violence. See JULIE SAMIA MAtR, STEPHEN TERET & SHANNON FRATrAROLI, A
Public Health Perspective on Gun Violence Prevention, in SUING THE GUN INDUSTRY, supra note
28, 39, at 44-45.
98. See David Barstow, A Chicago Story of Guns, Gangs and Self-Defense: To Destroy or
Defend, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Jan. 3, 1999, at .A.
99. Id.
100. For example, New York had more than three times Chicago's population, yet had fewer
gun homicides. Id.
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social change by taking action against the gun industry. 01 He turned to
Deputy Chicago Corporation Counsel Lawrence Rosenthal to lead the
effort. 
102
At first, Rosenthal and his colleagues in the Corporation Counsel's
office focused on tort theories similar to those relied on by the Castano
lawyers in the New Orleans case. 0 3 However, these theories had been
no more successful in their prior uses against the gun industry than they
had been in early efforts against tobacco companies. 1 n Just as tobacco
companies had been able to point to individual smokers' decisions to use
tobacco products as negating the companies' liability for health harms to
smokers, gun manufacturers had been able to point to the wrongful use
of handguns by criminals as breaking the causal chain linking the harm
to victims of gun violence back to the gun manufacturers.1
0 5
There were also other reasons to be more sanguine about the pros-
pects for success of suits against the gun industry than for suits against
the tobacco companies. First, while the harms resulting from cigarette
smoking are uniformly dispersed geographically, as stated above, the
brunt of the harms of gun violence are borne by urban areas. 10 6 Thus, it
is no surprise that cities led the charge against the gun industry, rather
than states, as was the case in the legal attack against the tobacco compa-
nies. 1 7 Indeed, not only are rural areas differentially impacted by gun
violence, but many rural citizens are passionately attached to their fire-
arms and were supporters rather than opponents of the gun industry. 0 8
This urban/rural split made the prospect of legislative support for a set-
tlement with the gun industry, along the lines of what would have been
required to implement the tobacco MSA, questionable at both the state
and federal levels.' °9 Second, the gun industry was not nearly as large or
financially successful as the tobacco industry. While this may have
meant less relentless and effective opposition to litigation against the
industry, it also made the prospect of a large financial judgment bank-
rupting the industry a much more realistic prospect than in the case of the
101. Id. Accord Fox Butterfield, Chicago is Suing Over Guns From Suburbs, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 13, 1998, at A18; Unnet Myers, Go Ahead... Make Her Day; With Her Direct Approach and
Quiet Confidence, Chicago Lawyer Anne Kimball Gives Gunmakers a Powerful Weapon, CHI. TRIB.,
May 2, 1999, at C12.
102. Barstow, supra note 98, at 1 A; ERICHSON, supra note 87, at 134.
103. ERICHSON, supra note 87, at 134.
104. See id. at 132.
105. See Barstow, supra note 98, at IA; Myers, supra note 101, at C12; Van Voris, supra note
90, at Al.
106. See supra text accompanying note 97.
107. See ERICHSON, supra note 87, at 149; Van Voris, supra note 90, at Al. Only New York
Attorney General Eliot Spitzer brought a major lawsuit against the gun manufacturers on behalf of a
State. See Spitzer v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 761 N.Y.S.2d 192 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003).
108. See ERICHSON, supra note 87, at 148.
109. The likely opposition of the powerful lobbying group the National Rifle Association
(NRA) would have been another major impediment. Id. at 151.
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tobacco industry.' l0 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it was clear
that even when used in the manner for which they were intended, ciga-
rettes caused harm to both smokers and bystanders (through passive ex-
posure to cigarette smoke). However, guns, by contrast, were said to
cause harm only when used improperly, for criminal purposes, rather
than for their proper purposes of sporting use or self-defense.'l
For all of these reasons, Rosenthal soured on the idea of bringing a
traditional tort action on behalf of Chicago against the gun industry.
1 2
In order to find a more promising theory to advance, Rosenthal and his
colleagues began scouring data kept by the Chicago police department
regarding the more than 17,000 illegal guns it recovers every year. 113 It
turned out that large numbers of these guns could be traced to a small
number of gun shops located just outside the city's borders 1 4 Multiple
guns had been sold to "straw purchasers" who in turn provided the guns
to gang members and other criminals." 15 The lawyers became convinced
that gun manufacturers and distributors were deliberately oversupplying
suburban gun shops with products that, given the lack of demand for
them in the suburbs, would naturally end up in Chicago, in violation of
the city's ordinance."16 Rosenthal began to think of the excess supply of
guns in terms of air pollution, floating from a smokestack located down-
wind from the city, but leaving its harmful residue within the city lim-
its. 117 In such circumstances, public nuisance would be the appropriate
legal claim to pursue. Once word got out that Chicago was pursuing the
public nuisance theory in relation to the gun industry, Rosenthal received
an offer of assistance from Temple University Law School professor
David Kairys. t1 8 Kairys had been working with the City of Philadelphia
in developing a similar theory on behalf of Philadelphia's efforts to ad-
dress its growing gun violence problem.11 9 Philadelphia had declined to
file suit against the gun industry by the time Chicago filed its suit,120 and
110. Butterfield, supra note 101, at A18; Sugarman, supra note 28, at 207; Van Voris, supra
note 90, at Al.
111. Myers, supra note 101, at CI2.
112. Id.
113. Barstow, supra note 98, at IA. Since 1982, Chicago has had a city ordinance that virtual-
ly bans gun ownership in the City. Id.; see Butterfield, supra note 101, at A18.
114. Barstow, supra note 98, at IA.
115. Id.
116. Butterfield, supra note 101, at A18; Van Voris, supra note 90, at IA.
117. Barstow, supra note 98, at I A; Butterfield, supra note 101, at A18.
118. ERICHSON, supra note 87, at 134.
119. Id. at 132-33. For an academic presentation of Kairys' version of the theory, see David
Kairys, The Governmental Handgun Cases and the Elements and Underlying Policies of Public
Nuisance Law, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1175 (2000).
120. Some have speculated that Philadelphia Mayor Ed Rendell backed down from suing the
gun manufacturers due to his gubernatorial aspirations and fears that such a suit would alienate the
rural and suburban voters whose support Rendell would need in order to be successful. ERICHSON,
supra note 87, at 133. Rendell's successor would eventually file suit on behalf of the City against
the gun industry. See City of Philadelphia v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 277 F.3d 415, 419 (3d Cir.
2002).
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Kairys ended up working with Rosenthal in putting the Chicago case
together. '
2'
In order to support the city's public nuisance theory, Rosenthal
made use of the City Police Department's investigative resources. City
police officers launched an undercover investigation in which they posed
as gang members and other criminals, and went to many of the suburban
gun shops that had previously been identified to purchase guns for what
the undercover officers expressly described to the sellers to be illegal
purposes. 22 The undercover officers easily purchased the required fire-
arms. Based on this data, the city filed suit, contending that gun manu-
facturers, distributors, and retailers engaged in sales, supply, and market-
ing practices pursuant to which they knowingly caused guns to be im-
ported to and used illegally in Chicago for criminal purposes. 23
Not surprisingly, the gun industry responded by moving to dismiss
the city's complaint. First, the defendants argued that all of the gun sales
identified by the city were legal in themselves-compliant with the very
broad range of federal and state regulations governing the purchase and
124sale of guns. As such, they contended, these activities could not prop-
erly be deemed a public nuisance. Additionally, the defendants con-
tended that the intervening actions of criminals who improperly used
their products broke the causal chain between the manufacture, distribu-
tion, and sale of the guns and the harm suffered by the plaintiff.125 Final-
ly, the defendants challenged the theories of economic recovery ad-
vanced by the city.
126
In a judgment without a supporting opinion, the trial court granted
the defendants' motions to dismiss the case. 127 The city and county ap-
pealed, and the Illinois Appellate Court reversed, finding that the second
121. ERICHSON, supra note 87, at 134.
122. Barstow, supra note 98, at IA; Butterfield, supra note 101, at A18; Myers, supra note
101, at C12; Van Voris, supra note 90, at A1.
123. Second Amended Complaint 1, City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821 N.E.2d
1099 (111. 2005) (98 CH 015596).
124. See The Sports Authority's Section 2-615 and 2-619 Motion to Dismiss Second Amended
Complaint at II.B., City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821 N.E.2d 1099 (111. 2005) (98 CH
015596) [hereinafter Retailers Motion to Dismiss], 2000 WL 34611549; Manufacturer Defendants'
Section 2-615 Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint 2, City of Chicago v.
Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821 N.E.2d 1099 (111. 2005) (98 CH 015596) [hereinafter Manufacturers'
Motion to Dismiss], 2000 WL 34017053; Distributors' Consolidated Motion to Dismiss Counts I
and H of the Second Amended Complaint Pursuant to § 2-615 of the Illinois Code of Civil Proce-
dure, at 11.1., City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821 N.E.2d 1099 (111. 2005) (98 CH 015596)
[hereinafter Distributors' Motion to Dismiss], 2000 WL 34017038.
125. Retailers Motion to Dismiss, supra note 124, at 1.D., F.; Manufacturers' Motion to Dis-
miss, supra note 124, % 4; Distributors' Motion to Dismiss, supra note 124, at 11.2.
126. Retailers Motion to Dismiss, supra note 124, at II.G.; Manufacturers' Motion to Dismiss,
supra note 124, 4; Distributors' Motion to Dismiss, supra note 124, at 11.3.
127. City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 2000 WL 35509506 (Ill. Cir.) (Sept. 15, 2000)
(Trial Order).
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amended complaint did state a cause of action for public nuisance. 128
The defendants, in turn, appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court. In a
lengthy opinion, the court reversed the judgment of the appellate court,
and affirmed the judgment of the trial court dismissing the case.129 First,
the court determined that in order to state a claim for public nuisance, the
plaintiffs would have to show negligent conduct on the part of the defen-
dants. 130 However, the court found the defendants were not negligent for
a variety of reasons. First, the court found that the defendant manufac-
turers and distributors did not owe a duty of care to the public at large "to
prevent their firearms from 'ending up in the hands of persons who use
and possess them illegally."-031 Additionally, the court concluded that
the conduct of the defendants should not be viewed as the proximate
cause of the harm alleged by the plaintiffs, where their lawfully sold
products were illegally taken into the city and used by persons not under
the control of the defendants. 32 After addressing the negligence ques-
tion, the court also rejected a number of the remedial claims advanced by
the plaintiffs. 33 For example, the Court found that under the economic
loss doctrine, 134 plaintiffs would not be permitted to recover on a public
nuisance theory for purely economic losses of the type alleged in the
complaint. 35  The Court also ruled that under the municipal cost recov-
ery rule, 36 the plaintiffs would not be permitted to recover in tort for the
public expenditures made in performance of governmental functions of
the sort described above. 137  Thus, the City was left with few tangible
results from its efforts against the gun industry.
Few of the other cities to file lawsuits against the gun industry were
more successful in their efforts than Chicago was. The Ohio Supreme
Court ruled that the City of Cincinnati could go forward with its public
128. City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 785 N.E.2d 16, 31 (I1. App. Ct. 2003), rev'd,
City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821 N.E.2d 1099 (111. 2004). The plaintiffs' had not ap-
pealed from the dismissal of their claim for negligent entrustment from the First Amended Com-
plaint. Id. at 20.
129. City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821 N.E.2d 1099, 1148 (I11. 2004).
130. Id. at 1124.
131. Id. at 1126. The Court did not decide the question whether gun retailers owe such a duty
to the public at large. See id. at 1126-27.
132. Id. at 1136.
133. Id. at 1143-44. The plaintiffs had claimed more than $433 million in operating expenses
relating the alleged public nuisance created by the defendants during the years 1994-98. Id. at 1138.
This amount included expenses for emergency communications and response, health care treatment
provided to the victims of gun violence, police investigations, and the costs of prosecuting and
defending those accused of gun crimes. Id. at 1138-39.
134. Under the economic loss doctrine, where a tortfeasor's negligence causes no harm to the
person or property of the plaintiff, the plaintiff may not recover for purely economic losses. See,
e.g., 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 58 (2008).
135. City of Chicago, 821 N.E.2d at 1143.
136. Under the municipal cost recovery rule, a government cannot recover the costs of carrying
out public services from a tortfeasor who caused the need to provide the services. See, e.g., Barbara
J. Van Arsdale, Annotation, Construction and Application of "Municipal Cost Recovery Rule," or
"Free Public Services Doctrine", 32 A.L.R. 6th 261 (2008).
137. City of Chicago, 821 N.E.2d at 1146-47.
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nuisance claims against the gun industry. 138 Despite this fact, Cincinnati
dropped its suit a short while later.1 39  Similarly, the Indiana Supreme
Court ruled that the City of Gary could go forward with its gun lawsuit
on a public nuisance theory. 40 However, many courts applied reasoning
similar to that of the Illinois Supreme Court and refused to recognize the
public nuisance theory as applied to gun sales, marketing, and distribu-
tion. 1  New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer was able to enter into a
settlement with a single gun manufacturer, Smith and Wesson, 142 but the
company faced a tremendous backlash from gun activists and other man-
ufacturers, and no similar settlements were reached. 143  Additionally,
approximately thirty states passed legislation designed to protect the gun
industry from similar suits.'44 Then, in late 2005, Congress enacted fed-
eral legislation dismissing all pending claims of this type in both federal
and state courts, and preempting future such claims. 1
45
Though public nuisance claims against the gun industry were barred
by the 2005 legislation, skirmishes between cities and the gun industry
did not end at that point. Indeed, at the same time the District of Colum-
bia courts were ruling on the District's legal challenge to the gun indus-
try,146 individual plaintiffs, supported by gun advocates, challenged the
District's gun control laws in court. 47 In 2008, the U.S. Supreme Court
struck down some of the D.C. laws for violating the Second Amendment,
which it held confers an individual right to possess firearms as opposed
merely to vesting such a right in state militias.
148
138. City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 768 N.E.2d 1136, 1142-44 (Ohio 2002).
139. See ERICHSON, supra note 87, at 140.
140. City of Gary v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 801 N.E.2d 1222, 1234 (Ind. 2003).
141. See City of Philadelphia v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 277 F.3d 415, 421-22 (3d Cir. 2002);
Camden County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta, U.S.A. Corp., 273 F.3d 536, 539 (3d Cir.
2001); Ganim v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 780 A.2d 98, 132-33 (Conn. 2001); Penelas v. Arms Tech.,
Inc., 778 So. 2d 1042, 1045 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001); Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 750
N.E.2d 1055, 1068 (N.Y. 2001); Spitzer v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 761 N.Y.S.2d 192, 195, 198-99
(N.Y. App. Div. 2003).
142. See ERiCHSON, supra note 87, at 140.
143. See, e.g., Richard A. Nagareda, Gun Litigation in the Mass Tort Context, in SUING THE
GUN INDusTRY, supra note 28, 176, 181 (Timothy D. Lytton ed., 2005).
144. Recent Legislation, Tort Law-Civil Immunity-Congress Passes Prohibition of Qualified
Civil Claims Against Gun Manufacturers and Distributors-Protection of Lawful Commerce in
Arms Act, Pub. L No. 109-92, 119 Stat. 2095 (2005) (To Be Codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7901-7903, 18
U.S.C. §§ 922, 924), 119 HARV. L. REV. 1939, 1939, 1945 n.3 (2006).
145. Id. at 1940.
146. See District of Columbia v. Beretta, U.S.A., Corp., 872 A.2d 633, 637-38 (D.C. 2005)
(rejecting plaintiffs' claims for negligence and public nuisance, but allowing claims to go forward
based on D.C. statute imposing strict liability on manufacturers of certain types of guns for injuries
caused by those guns).
147. Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 373, 401 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (striking down
gun regulation legislation for violating the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution).
148. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2799-2800, 2821-22 (2008).
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3. Spitzer v. Merrill Lynch
In late 2000, Eric Dinallo, the head of the investor protection bureau
in the New York State Attorney General's office began to look into poss-
ible conflicts of interest within the financial services industry. 149 Dinal-
lo's interest in the matter began nearly a year previously when, during a
casual conversation, Dinallo's father posed the question of why so many
Wall Street research analysts had continued to issue "buy" recommenda-
tions for technology and internet stocks whose prices had been falling
through the floor. 150 In early 2001, Dinallo provided his boss, New York
Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, with a memorandum outlining his bu-
reau's priorities for the upcoming year.151  "Investigation of abuses by
investment advisors" was number two on the list.
152
It is not surprising that Spitzer encouraged Dinallo to move forward
with this particular investigation. First, both shared backgrounds as
prosecutors in the prestigious Manhattan District Attorney's office.
53
Second, Spitzer assumed his role as Attorney General in 1998 with an
ambitious vision for the office as an aggressive proponent of progressive
legal reform advanced through both litigation and regulation. 154 Spitzer
saw states as needing to step into the void created by the "new federal-
ism" that had been advocated by conservatives in Washington in all three
branches of government, and become vigorous enforcers of legal protec-
tions in a variety of areas including public health, the environment, anti-
trust, and public integrity. 155 Moreover, Spitzer already had a fairly dim
view of the ethics of Wall Street practice, 156 and was reluctant to coun-
tenance what he saw as misconduct going on in his home turf.
157
Dinallo's investigation got a boost during the summer, when he no-
ticed an item in the Wall Street Journal indicating that Merrill Lynch,
one of Wall Street's biggest and best known firms, had paid $400,000 to
a doctor named Debasis Kanjilal to settle claims that Kanjilal had been
defrauded into losing hundreds of thousands of dollars by buying and
holding stock in an internet company called InfoSpace, which had been
touted by Merrill Lynch's celebrity stock analyst Henry Blodget. 58 Kan-
149. See BROOKE A. MASTERS, SPOILING FOR A FIGHT: THE RISE OF ELIOT SPITZER 75-76
(2006); John Cassidy, The Investigation: How Eliot Spitzer Humbled Wall Street, THE NEW
YORKER, April 7, 2003, at 54, 55 available at
http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2003/04/07/030407fafact-cassidy. Dinallo presently serves as
Superintendent of New York's State Insurance Department. See Eric. R. Dinallo-Biography,
http://www.ins.state.ny.us/bios/bios edsup.htm (last visited Dec. 22, 2008).
150. MASTERS, supra note 149, at 76-77; Cassidy, supra note 149, at 55.
151. MASTERS, supra note 149, at 77; Cassidy, supra note 149, at 55.
152. Cassidy, supra note 149, at 55; see MASTERS, supra note 149, at 77.
153. See MASTERS, supra note 149, at 11, 49; Cassidy, supra note 149, at 55, 59.
154. See MASTERS, supra note 149, at 53; Cassidy, supra note 149, at 55.
155. MASTERS, supra note 149, at 52-53.
156. See Cassidy, supra note 149, at 55.
157. See id. at 62-64.
158. MASTERS, supra note 149, at 78; Cassidy, supra note 149, at 56.
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jilal alleged that Merrill had misled investors about InfoSpace's true eco-
nomic circumstances because the firm was planning on purchasing
another company, Go2Net, which was one of Merrill's investment bank-
ing clients. 159 Merrill stood to make fees of $17 million if the deal went
through. 160
Using the Attorney General's authority under New York's Martin
Act, the office sent subpoenas both to Kanjilal's lawyer Jacob Zamansky,
and to Merrill Lynch, asking the latter for a broad range of documents
relating to the company's internet initial public offerings (IPOs), internet
stock recommendations, and the compensation of internet stock ana-
lysts. 16' The Martin Act is a relatively unique statute 62 which played an
integral role in this and Spitzer's future efforts to take on the financial
services industry. The statute provides extremely broad authority to the
State Attorney General to investigate and prosecute fraud or deception in
connection with any security, commodity, or investment advice. 163 De-
spite its broad sweep, the statute had been little used as a tool to attack
the securities industry, though New York Attorney General Louis Lef-
kowitz had made some use of the statute during the late 1970s.'64 How-
ever, Lefkowitz had passed on the results of his investigations to federal
authorities, who were traditionally thought to be the primary enforcers
with regard to securities violations. 165 Spitzer, on the other hand, used
the statute to assert primary authority over securities companies where he
believed federal authorities had been lax in protecting investors. 66
The documents obtained by the Attorney General's office in re-
sponse to the InfoSpace subpoena included private e-mails which sug-
gested that research analysts such as Blodget were much less enthusiastic
about InfoSpace behind the scenes than their public recommendations
suggested. 167 For example, even at a time when Blodget had publicly
159. Cassidy, supra note 149, at 56.
160. MASTERS, supra note 149, at 78.
161. See MASTERS, supra note 149, at 78-79; Cassidy, supra note 149, at 56.
162. See generally N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 352-359h (McKinney 2008). Subsequent to the
Merrill Lynch case, a number of other states passed or considered legislation similar to the Martin
Act that would expand these states' authority to regulate the securities industry. See Jonathan R.
Macey, Positive Political Theory and Federal Usurpation of the Regulation of Corporate Gover-
nance: The Coming Preemption of the Martin Act, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 951, 959-60 (2005).
163. See Macey, supra note 162, at 960 (citing N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352 (McKinney 2008)).
The Act, which was passed in 1921, originally provided only for civil enforcement. However, in
1955, criminal penalties were added for fraud. Aaron M. Tidman, Note, Securities Low Enforcement
in the Twenty-First Century: Why States Are Better Equipped Than the Securities and Exchange
Commission to Enforce Securities Law, 57 SYRACUSE L. REv. 379, 389 (2007). Spitzer, nonetheless,
relied solely on the statute's civil provisions in his pursuit of Merrill Lynch. See Cassidy, supra note
149, at 64.
164. MASTERS, supra note 149, at 57-58; Jonathan Mathiesen, Survey, Dr. Spitzlove Or: How
I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love "Balkanization," 2006 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 311,316 (2006);
Tidman, supra note 163, at 392.
165. MASTERS, supra note 149, at 58.
166. See Macey, supra note 162, at 952.
167. See MASTERS, supra note 149, at 80.
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given the stock Merrill's highest possible rating, he was referring to the
stock in private e-mails as "a powder keg," and described the stock as
having a "bad smell."' 168 Yet Blodget did not downgrade the stock's rat-
ing until after the deal with Go2Net had been completed, even though by
then the stock price had fallen from $122 per share, when Kanjilal
bought, 169 to less than $10 per share.
170
A couple of months after issuing the InfoSpace subpoena, the At-
torney General's office issued another subpoena to Merrill Lynch under
the Martin Act relating to a company called GoTo.com (no relation to
Go2Net).171 Blodget had made that company the subject of one of his
172rare downgrades in June 2001. The Wall Street Journal had noted that
the downgrade came just hours after GoTo.com had chosen Credit Suisse
First Boston to handle its upcoming stock offering, rather than Merrill
Lynch. 173 The e-mails that turned up in response to this subpoena sug-
gested an even stronger connection between Merrill's banking business
and its analysts than was the case regarding InfoSpace. For example,
Merrill's initial decision to offer a rating to GoTo.com was based on a
promise made by its bankers to arrange for such a rating if GoTo.com
would use Merrill for a "private placement" in September 2000.174 From
there, the e-mail trail showed a consistent struggle between Merrill's
bankers, who wanted better ratings for the company, and Merrill's ana-
lysts, who were uncomfortable issuing such ratings. 175 The results were
often compromises between what the bankers wanted, and what the ana-
lysts thought was actually justified, based on the company's perfor-
mance. 176 In any event, the company was not downgraded until after the
Credit Suisse deal mentioned above.
177
After the InfoSpace and GoTo.com subpoenas, the Attorney Gener-
al's office served Merrill Lynch with yet another subpoena, this one de-
manding all of the e-mails from its research analysts' internet group.
178
Within the boxes of documents provided in response to the subpoena
were additional e-mails suggesting that research analysts had fudged
their recommendations in response to pressure from bankers within the
company, including one e-mail in which Blodget expressly threatened to
start "calling the stocks.., like we see them" unless he received clearer
instructions on how to reconcile "management's demands for down-
168. MASTERS, supra note 149, at 80-81.
169. Cassidy, supra note 149, at 56.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. MASTERS, supra note 149, at 79; Cassidy, supra note 149, at 56.
173. MASTERS, supra note 149, at 79; Cassidy, supra note 149, at 56.
174. MASTERS, supra note 149, at 79; Cassidy, supra note 149, at 58.
175. MASTERS, supra note 149, at 79; Cassidy, supra note 149, at 58-59.
176. Cassidy, supra note 149, at 59; see MASTERS, supra note 149, at 80.
177. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
178. Cassidy, supra note 149, at 60.
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grades on falling stocks with the investment banking team's demands for
good press for its clients."' 7 9
At this point, Spitzer's team finally believed it had enough evidence
to sue Merrill Lynch under the Martin Act.' 80 The team initiated discus-
sions with Merrill Lynch in an effort to settle the matter prior to filing
suit. 81 However, the negotiations did not go well. 182 A particular stick-
ing point was whether the e-mails and other evidence uncovered through
the Attorney General's investigation would become public, or would
remain sealed, as was the desire of the company. 83 Spitzer's view, with
regard to this and other matters, was that public disclosure was necessary
to based legal reform. 184 Thus, confidentiality was off the table as far as
he was concerned.
85
On April 8, 2002, the Attorney General exercised his authority un-
der Section 354 of the Martin Act, 86 to appear ex parte before a judge of
New York's Supreme Court, 87 and seek an order for a public inquiry
regarding alleged violations of the Act, as well as for injunctive relief in
support of such an inquiry. 88 The statute appears to provide the Court
no authority to refuse to grant such relief upon a showing by the Attor-
ney General that "information and belief that the testimony" of persons
alleged to have violated the Act's anti-fraud provisions is "material and
necessary."'' 89  Thus, not surprisingly, Supreme Court Judge Martin
Shoenfeld granted the order sought by the Attorney General. 90
Following issuance of the judge's order, the Attorney General en-
gaged in what would become a hallmark of his future high profile inves-
tigations: the outraged press conference.' 91 At this, Spitzer referred to
Merrill's transgressions regarding its research analyst information as "a
shocking betrayal of trust."' 92
One thing that the New York government attorneys were not aware
of was a little known provision of the Federal Investment Company Act
179. MASTERS, supra note 149, at 84.
180. Cassidy, supra note 149, at 61.
181. MASTERS, supra note 149, at 85; see Cassidy, supra note 149, at 62.
182. MASTERS, supra note 149, at 88; Cassidy, supra note 149, at 61.
183. MASTERS, supra note 149, at 88-89; Cassidy, supra note 149, at 62.
184. MASTERS, supra note 149, at 89.
185. Id.
186. N.Y. GEN. Bus. L. § 354 (Mckinney 2008).
187. The Supreme Court is the trial court within the New York State Court system.
188. N.Y. GEN. BUS. L. § 354 (McKinney 2008).
189. Id.
190. MASTERS, supra note 149, at 92; Cassidy, supra note 149, at 62; Order Pursuant to Gen-
eral Business Law Section 354 (Apr. 8, 2002),
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/media center/2002/apraprO8b02_attach.pdf; Affidavit in Support of
Application for an Order Pursuant to General Business Law Section 354 (Apr. 2002),
http://www.oag.state.ny.uslmedia-center/2002/apr/MerrillL.pdf.
191. MASTERS, supra note 149, at 92; Cassidy, supra note 149, at 64.
192. MASTERS, supra note 149, at 92.
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of 1940193 that barred securities firms under court order from operating
mutual funds. 194 A shutdown of Merrill's mutual fund business would
have seriously jeopardized the company, and went far beyond the degree
of pressure the Attorney General hoped to bring to bear against the com-
pany. 195 Thus, later that afternoon Spitzer sent Dinallo back into court
and had him request (successfully) that the judge stay the injunctive part
of his order so that Merrill could continue to operate its mutual fund
business.
196
Despite that fact, the adverse publicity from the court order caused
serious harm to Merrill. The firm's own stock-market valuation fell
more than $5 billion within a week. 197 Moreover, the SEC, embarrassed
at having been beaten to the punch by Spitzer, launched its own investi-
gation regarding research practices. 198 Unwilling to face the continuing
public relations nightmare and the prospects of an SEC investigation,
Merrill Lynch reached a settlement with Spitzer on May 21, 2002.199
Among other provisions, the settlement called for Merrill to pay a fine of
$100 million;2°° to provide certain disclosures on its research reports
regarding income received from the subject of the report relating to
banking activities;2° 1 to separate research analyst compensation from its
investment banking business; 20 2 to set up a committee designed to safe-
guard the independence of its research recommendations; 20 3 and to limit
the usage of research analysts or information in conjunction with solicit-
ing banking business.
2°4
Upon closure of the Merrill Lynch investigation, the New York At-
torney General's office expanded its inquiry regarding research analyst
independence to a number of other major Wall Street financial services
firms. By the end of the year, Spitzer and other regulators had reached a
"global settlement" with ten major Wall Street firms and other regula-
tors.20 5 In addition to implementing measures designed to promote re-
search analyst independence, the settlement provided for $1.4 billion in
193. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1.
194. MASTERS, supra note 149, at 93; Cassidy, supra note 149, at 64.
195. See MASTERS, supra note 149, at 93; Cassidy, supra note 149, at 64.
196. Cassidy, supra note 149, at 64.
197. See MASTERS, supra note 149, at 93; Cassidy, supra note 149, at 65.
198. Cassidy, supra note 149, at 65.
199. See Agreement Between the Attorney General of the State of New York and Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. (May 21, 2002) (hereinafter Merrill Lynch Settlement),
www.oag.state.ny.us/bureaus/investor-protection/pdfs/merrill-agreement.pdf.
200. Merrill Lynch Settlement, supra note 199, 1 24.
201. Merrill Lynch Settlement, supra note 199, 5.
202. Merrill Lynch Settlement, supra note 199, 7-11.
203. Merrill Lynch Settlement, supra note 199, 91 12-13.
204. Merrill Lynch Settlement, supra note 199, (M 14-15.
205. Cassidy, supra note 149, at 72. The ten firms that joined the settlement were Bear Stems,
Credit Suisse First Boston, Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, J.P. Morgan Chase; Lehman Brothers,
Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, Solomon Smith Barney, and U.B.S. Id.
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fines, and a ban on the practice of "spinning, '' 2°6 which Spitzer's office
had also been investigating.
207
The Merrill Lynch investigation would also form the template for a
number of other high profile investigations that Spitzer would launch
involving the financial services industry, prior to his election as Gover-
nor of New York in 2006, and his shocking resignation in 2008.208 For
example, Spitzer initiated investigations that led to major settlements
involving "market timing," or late trading practices by mutual fund com-
209panies. Spitzer also took on insurance industry giants Marsh &
McLennan and AIG over allegations of steering clients to insurance
companies that paid them kickbacks, and covering the practice up with
false insurance bids and similar devices.21°
B. Situating the Three Cases Within the Cause Lawyering Literature
This section of the paper attempts to situate the above case descrip-
tions within the literature regarding cause lawyering. In order to do so, it
will first draw a comparison between the government lawsuits and cause
lawyering generally. Next, it will apply the typologies offered by Hil-
bink, Sarat, and Scheingold to the government litigation actions de-
scribed here.
1. Cause Lawyering and Government Lawyers Generally
The idea of using law and the legal system to effectuate broad-based
social change is not a new one. In America, the idea relates back to at
least the early decades of the twentieth century, when the NAACP
launched its campaign against segregated schools, 211 and the ACLU un-
dertook a series of law reform suits in areas including women's rights,
abortion, sexual privacy, free speech rights, prisoner's rights, military
law, and amnesty.212 Then, in the 1960s and 1970s, during this period of
206. id. The practice of spinning involved reserving certain numbers of Initial Public Offering
(IPO) shares for current or future investment banking customers. MASTERS, supra note 149, at 108.
During the tech boom, when IPO shares frequently doubled or tripled in value shortly after issuance,
distributing such shares was tantamount to handing out free money. Id. By contrast, ordinary inves-
tors found it increasingly difficult to obtain IPO shares during this period.
207. See Cassidy, supra note 149, at 68.
208. See Ellen Wulfhorst, New York Governor Eliot Spitzer Resigns But More Woes Likely,
REUTERS UK, March 13, 2008, available at
http://uk.reuters.conarticle/worldNews/idUKN 1216491420080313.
209. See Macey, supra note 162, at 965-66.
210. See MASTERS, supra note 149, at 201-219, 227-49.
211. See JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS: How A DEDICATED BAND OF
LAWYERS FOUGHT FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION (1994); RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE:
THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR
EQUALITY (1975); WARREN D. ST. JAMES, THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT
OF COLORED PEOPLE: A CASE STUDY IN PRESSURE GROUPS (1958); MARK V. TUSHNET, THE
NAACP'S LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION 1925-1950 (1987).
212. Robert L. Rabin, Lawyers for Social Change: Perspectives on Public Interest Law, 28
STAN. L. REV. 207, 213 (1976); see SAMUEL WALKER, IN DEFENSE OF AMERICAN LIBERTIES: A
HISTORY OF THE ACLU (1990); Ruth B. Cowan, Women's Rights Through Litigation: An Examina-
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broad liberal social ferment, left-of-center lawyers in such diverse set-
tings as legal aid offices, law reform oriented "back up centers," and law
school clinical programs, often modeling their efforts on the earlier work
of the NAACP and ACLU, engaged in a range of efforts to use law and
lawyering to bring about social change.213 More recently, as the political
winds have shifted rightward, conservative lawyers and interest groups
have emerged that have begun to use law and legal work to achieve so-
cial change in a manner similar to that employed by their predecessors in
each of the two periods mentioned above.214
Despite this history, the term "cause lawyering" has only recently
received broad acceptance, largely due to an ongoing project of legal
sociologists Austin Sarat215 and Stuart G. Scheingold. 21 6 In an ongoing
series, now numbering five volumes, Sarat, Scheingold, and their many
contributors, have sought to map the terrain of what they have come to
identify as cause lawyering. 1 7 Sarat and Scheingold acknowledge that
the field they seek to describe defies easy identification and is subject to
constant shifts in terrain. 218 As a common denominator however, cause
lawyering is usually "directed at altering some aspect of the social, eco-
nomic, and political status quo.,, 219 Given this broad parameter, a strong
claim could be made that the cases discussed above represent examples
of cause lawyering, as each was directed in large measure at altering
some aspect of the social, economic, and/or political status quo.
On the other hand, there are a number of reasons why the govern-
ment attorneys discussed above fit uneasily within the category of cause
lawyers. First, while the examples discussed above may present in-
stances in which the involved government lawyers took on the role of
tion of the American Civil Liberties Union Women's Rights Project, 1971-1976, 8 COLUM. HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 373 (1976).
213. See MARTHA F. DAVIS, BRUTAL NEED: LAWYERS AND THE WELFARE RIGHTS
MOVEMENT, 1960-1973, 2-3 (1993) (describing different legal strategies for practicing poverty law
through various organizations); Margaret Martin Barry, Jon C. Dubin, & Peter A. Joy, Clinical
Education for This Millennium: The Third Wave, 7 CLINICAL L. REV. 1, 10 (2000) (discussing the
history of student law clinics); Steven K. Berenson, A Primer for New Civil Law Clinic Students, 38
MCGEORGE L. REV. 603, 606-07, 613-14 (2007) (providing a brief history of legal aid in the twen-
tieth century). See generally Deborah J. Cantrell, A Short History of Poverty Lawyers in the United
States, 5 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 11 (2003); William P. Quigley, The Demise of Law Reform and the
Triumph of Legal Aid: Congress and the Legal Services Corporation from the 1960s to the 1990s,
17 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 241 (1998).
214. See, e.g., Ann Southworth, Professional Identity and Political Commitment among Law-
yers for Conservative Causes, in Sarat & Scheingold, STRUCTURE AND AGENCY 83-85; Anthony
Paik, Ann Southworth & John P. Heinz, Lawyers of the Right: Networks and Organization, 32 LAW
& Soc. INQUIRY 883, 884-85 (2007); Ann Southworth, Conservative Lawyers and the Contest over
the Meaning of "Public Interest Law," 52 UCLA L. REV. 1223, 1224-27 (2005).
215. William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Jurisprudence and Political Science and Five
College Fortieth Anniversary Professor, Amherst College.
216. Professor Emeritus of Political Science, University of Washington.
217. See supra note 1.
218. Sarat & Scheingold, CAUSE LAWYERING, supra note 1, at 5, 7; SCHEINGOLD & SARAT,
SOMETHING TO BELIEVE, supra note I, at 3.
219. Sarat & Scheingold, CAUSE LAWYERING, supra note 1, at 4.
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cause lawyer, such lawyers play the role of conventional lawyer in many
other instances. For example, in addition to having broad ranging au-
thority to bring lawsuits in pursuit of the public interest, state attorneys
general and city attorneys have statutory and common law responsibili-
ties to defend government actors when they are sued in routine contract
and tort matters. 220  Additionally, when such government lawyers are
required to defend government entities in lawsuits challenging those enti-
ties' policies and procedures, the government lawyers frequently find
themselves on the opposite side of cases from paradigmatic cause law-
yers who have brought these cases for law reform or other similar objec-
tives. 221 Nonetheless, within Sarat and Scheingold's framework, a law-
yer need not act as a cause lawyer at all times, in all settings, in order to
claim the characterization at certain times and in certain contexts. For
example, two of the main settings that Sarat and Scheingold identify as
loci of cause lawyering activity are large corporate law firms, which en-
222
gage in cause lawyering as part of their pro bono activities, and small
private firms, which engage in a mix of cause lawyering and convention-
al lawyering, the latter often necessary to keep the firms afloat economi-
cally. 23 Thus, the mere fact that the government attorneys discussed
above were not engaged in cause lawyering on a full time basis does not
deprive the particular campaigns addressed above from being characte-
rized as such.
It should be noted that though the range of examples of cause la-
wyering identified by the contributors to the Sarat and Scheingold series
is extremely broad, none of the contributions focus on American gov-
ernment lawyers as cause lawyers.224 In countries other than the United
States, some of the cause lawyers identified do work within the govern-
ment itself.225  Perhaps this difference results from the different shape
220. See, e.g., Steven K. Berenson, Hard Bargaining on Behalf of the Government Tortfeasor:
A Study in Governmental Lawyer Ethics, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 345, 346 (2005) [hereinafter
Berenson, Hard Bargaining].
221. See, e.g., Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533,536-39 (2001) (U.S. government
lawyers defending restrictions on practice of legal services attorneys against challenge by a broad
range of cause lawyers).
222. SCHEINGOLD AND SARAT, SOMETHING TO BELIEVE, supra note 1, at 74.
223. Id. at 88.
224. See Hilbink, Categories, supra note 3, at 661 n.5. Perhaps an exception to this might be
the legal services lawyers and public defenders whose work is discussed extensively throughout the
series. See, e.g., SCHEINGOLD & SARAT, SOMETHING TO BELIEVE, supra note 1, at 80; Stuart A.
Scheingold & Anne Bloom, Transgressive Cause Lawyering: Practice Sites and the Politicization
of the Professional, 5 INT'L J. LEGAL PROF. 209, 229-236 (1998) [hereinafter Scheingold & Bloom,
Politicization]. However, even though legal services lawyers and public defenders are government
lawyers in the sense that their salaries are paid by the government, they are charged with
representing individual litigants rather than the government itself. Indeed, such lawyers often
represent their individual clients against government entities (that is always the case for public
defenders, and frequently the case for legal services lawyers). Thus, for purposes of the following
discussion, I do not include these lawyers within the category of government attorneys.
225. See, e.g., Yoav Dotan, The Global Village of Human Rights: Patterns of Cooperation
between State and Civil Rights Lawyers in Israel, in Sarat & Scheingold, GLOBAL ERA, supra note 1,
at 248-52 (discussing cooperation between Israeli civil rights lawyers and lawyers within Israel's
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that cause lawyering takes in established liberal democracies, where rule-
of-law systems are relatively stable, and emerging democracies or autho-
ritarian regimes, where such systems are not well established. In the
latter case, cause lawyering often takes on a largely defensive role-
attempting to protect individuals from arbitrary treatment and repression
on the part of the state.226 On the other hand, cause lawyers in liberal
227states can take a more proactive role vis-A-vis the state. In any event,
this absence of discussion of American government lawyers as cause
lawyers should not be viewed as being determinative if, as will be con-
tended below, the actions of such lawyers resemble those of paradigmat-
ic cause lawyers in other respects.
Another tension in viewing ranking government lawyers of the type
discussed here as cause lawyers has to do with the status such lawyers
hold within the profession. As Sarat and Scheingold frequently point
out, "cause lawyering is everywhere a deviant strain within the legal pro-
fession. ' 28 Indeed in large measure, cause lawyers operate at the mar-
gins of the legal profession.229 It is true that the legal profession has re-
versed its initial overt hostility to cause lawyers. 230 However, the result
has been, rather than a full embrace of cause lawyers, what Sarat and
Scheingold characterize as a "fragile alliance" between cause lawyers
and the broader profession.231 Indeed, this fragile alliance may be mostly
one of convenience, with the broader profession needing the "cover"
cause lawyers provide for conventional lawyers' arguable failure to fully
live up to the profession's stated ideals of providing broad access to jus-
tice and serving the good of the public as a whole as well as that of its
individual clients.232 In any event, while government lawyers as a whole
occupy something of an intermediate status position within the profes-
sion between that of cause lawyers on the low end and corporate lawyers
on the high end,233 ranking government lawyers such as the state attor-
neys general and the city attorneys discussed above, do in fact enjoy a
respected status within the profession. As will be discussed in the fol-
lowing Part of this paper, this status may allow such government lawyers
to transcend some of the limitations that have plagued cause lawyers in
terms of their effectiveness. But for present purposes, the status of rank-
Attorney General's office in an effort to protect the civil rights of Palestinians in the Occupied
Territories); Lucie White, Two Worlds of Ghanian Cause Lawyers, in Sarat & Scheingold, GLOBAL
ERA, supra note 1, at 59-65 (discussing lawyers who work within government agencies on matters of
economic development policies in an effort to raise Ghanian standards of living).
226. Sarat & Scheingold, CAUSE LAWYERING, supra note 1, at 5.
227. Id. at 5-6.
228. Id. at 3.
229. SCHEINGOLD & SARAT, SOMETHING TO BELIEVE, supra note 1, at 4.
230. Id. at 29.
231. Id. at44.
232. Id. at 49.
233. See, e.g., JOHN P. HEINZ, ROBERT R. NELSON, REBECCA L. SANDEFUR & EDWARD 0.
LAUMANN, URBAN LAWYERS: THE NEW SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR 82-88 (2005).
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ing government lawyers does create a tension regarding whether it is
appropriate to categorize such lawyers as cause lawyers at all.
On the other hand, there are also strong reasons to place the legal
campaigns discussed above within the category of cause lawyering. First
and foremost is the overt social change orientation of each of the legal
campaigns discussed above. Indeed, each of the government lawyers
primarily responsible for initiating these legal campaigns expressly ac-
knowledged and embraced a social change justification in initiating the
legal action. For example, Mike Moore expressly saw himself as calling
the tobacco industry to account for decades of harm caused to the health
of Mississippians and the State's public fisc. 234  Lawrence Rosenthal
similarly acted in conformity with his background in public law en-
forcement in turning to the courts to try to make the city streets of Chica-
go safer.235 And Eliot Spitzer plainly viewed himself as policing a secur-
ities industry that had victimized ordinary investors while the federal
regulators who were responsible for its oversight failed to live up to their
responsibilities.236
Additionally, Sarat and Scheingold have pointed out that one of the
distinguishing features of cause lawyering is the way it blurs what was
traditionally considered to be a clear dividing line between legal and
political activity. 237 Yet who better than an elected or an appointed state
attorney general or city attorney illustrates the confluence between law
and politics? Each of these individuals is at the same time a lawyer, le-
gal practitioner, and member of the legal profession, as well as an elected
or appointed public official, operating within the thoroughly political
milieu of electoral politics.
Finally, Sarat and Scheingold have also focused on cause and con-
ventional lawyers' differing stances toward the legal profession's non-
accountability tenet as a critical distinction between them.238 In short,
this non-accountability principle holds that lawyers are not responsible
for the ends sought by their clients, as long as the ends sought are legally
permissible. 239 As stated in Rule 1.2(b) of the American Bar Associa-
tion's Model Rules of Professional Conduct, "A lawyer's representation
234. See supra notes 22-27, 50-51 and accompanying text.
235. Barstow, supra note 98.
236. See supra notes 154-157 and accompanying text.
237. Sarat & Scheingold, STRUCTURE AND AGENCY, supra note 1, at 9.
238. Sarat & Scheingold, CAUSE LAWYERING, supra note 1, at 3; SCHEINGOLD & SARAT,
SOMETHING TO BELIEVE, supra note 1, at 7.
239. David Luban, The Adversary System Excuse, in THE GOOD LAWYER: LAWYERS' ROLES
AND LAWYERS' ETHICS 83, 90 (David Luban, ed. 1983); Steven K. Berenson, Institutional Profes-
sionalism for Lawyers: Realizing the Virtues of Civic Professionalism, 109 W. VA. L. REV. 67, 96
(2006); Murray L. Schwartz, The Professionalism and Accountability of Lawyers, 66 CAL. L. REV.
669, 673-74 (1978). Others commentators have described this as the legal profession's "neutrality"
principle. E.g., Gerald J. Postema, Moral Responsibility in Professional Ethics, 55 N.Y.U. L. REv.
63, 73 (1980); William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional
Ethics, 1978 WIS. L. REV. 29, 36 (1978).
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of a client... does not constitute an endorsement of the client's political,
economic, social or moral views or activities.,' 240 Thus, the conventional
lawyer should be equally at home representing either side in a particular
legal dispute.24' Because lawyers are not to be judged based upon the
justice or lack thereof of the positions they advocate, the measure of la-
wyering effectiveness becomes an assessment of the technical quality of
the legal services rendered on behalf of the client.242
In contrast to conventional lawyers, cause lawyers reject this non-
accountability principle. 43 Not only do cause lawyers embrace the ends
that their clients seek, but cause lawyers affirmatively seek out clients
and causes with which they can identify in moral, political, and social
terms. 244 Indeed, for many cause lawyers, the cause itself takes priority
over any individual client.245 This stance also brings cause lawyers into
conflict with the fundamental tenet of the legal profession which de-
mands that lawyers always place their clients' objectives ahead of any
personal, financial, or political interests of the lawyers themselves.
246
However, to the extent that cause lawyers' rejection of non-
accountability places them on a collision course with the core principles
of the mainstream legal profession, cause lawyers embrace this conflict
rather than avoid it.
247
To the extent that government lawyers are engaged in defending
government officials or government entities in lawsuits challenging these
parties' actions, the government lawyers tend to embrace the profession's
240. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(b) (2002).
241. Scheingold & Sarat hold out the example of renowned litigator David Boies, who in one
case defended IBM against antitrust charges brought by the federal government, yet later represented
the United States in its antitrust action against Microsoft. SCHEINGOLD & SARAT, SOMETHING TO
BELIEVE, supra note 1, at 8.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 9.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. In an oft quoted passage, Henry Lord Brougham described his representation of Queen
Caroline to the British Parliament in 1820 as follows: "[An advocate, in the discharge of his duty,
knows but one person in all the world, and that person is his client. To save that client by all means
and expedients, and at all hazards and costs to other persons ... is his first and only duty; and in
performing this duty he must not regard the alarm, the torments, the destruction which he may bring
upon others." 2 TRIAL OF QUEEN CAROLINE, 8 (Joseph Nightingale ed., London, J. Robins and Co.
Albion Press 1821). Though recent commentators have argued whether Brougham truly intended
this statement to represent his assessment of the legal advocate's proper role, compare Fred C.
Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, "Anything Rather Than a Deliberate and Well Considered Opinion" -
Henry Lord Brougham, Written By Himself, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1221 passim (2006), with
Monroe H. Freedman, Henry Lord Brougham and Zeal, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1319 passim (2006),
there is little doubt that both the ethical rules governing lawyers and fiduciary principles require
lawyers to place their clients' interests ahead of their own. E.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)(2) (2002) ("a lawyer shall not represent a client.., if there is a significant risk
that the representation of [the] client[] will be materially limited ... by a personal interest of the
lawyer."); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 16 cmt. b (2000).
247. SCHEINGOLD & SARAT, SOMETHING TO BELIEVE, supra note 1, at 9.
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non-accountability principle.248 However, in situations such as the cases
discussed above, where the government lawyer pursues public protection
actions in the name of a particular state, the United States, "the people"
of a given state, or some other similar inchoate public entity, the applica-
bility of the non-accountability principle becomes difficult. Of course,
the ability of an entity client to articulate the ends its lawyer is to seek
pursuant to the non-accountability doctrine is a difficult issue in all in-
stances of entity representation, including conventional representation of
corporate entities. However, corporate law establishes clear principles
regarding which individuals have "speaking authority" on behalf of the
organization, for purposes of giving instructions to its lawyers. 249  By
contrast, there are no such clearly established principles for determining
the ends a lawyer should pursue when the client is the state, the people,
or the public interest. 25° At a minimum, it is clear that in such circums-
tances, the government lawyer plays a much greater role in shaping and
identifying the ends to be sought by the client than is the case with regard
to conventional lawyering.251 And, in circumstances such as two of the
three cases discussed above, where the government lawyer is authorized
by law to bring an action in his or her own name,252 the non-
accountability principle no longer makes very much sense at all. Indeed,
the manner in which government lawyers in these circumstances tran-
scend the non-accountability principle is perhaps the most powerful rea-
son why it may be appropriate to characterize such lawyers as cause law-
yers.
2. Hilbink's Typology
In a thoughtful review essay focusing on the first two volumes in
Sarat and Scheingold's cause lawyering project, University of Massachu-
248. See supra note 239. Indeed, in my first job in legal practice, I worked in the office of
Massachusetts Attorney General Scott Harshbarger, a liberal Democrat. I worked in the division in
the office that was responsible for defending State government agencies when they were sued re-
garding their programs and policies. Berenson, Hard Bargaining, supra note 220, at 345. At the
time, Republican Governor William Weld was engaged in a draconian program of cutting social
spending by the State in an effort to balance the State budget. This required our office to engage in
numerous suits in which we defended the various budget cuts against claims by paradigmatic cause
lawyers from within the legal services and broader advocacy communities on behalf of disadvan-
taged persons. General Harshbarger went to great pains to distance himself publicly from the Weld
administration policies that his office was legally required to defend, while at the same time lauding
the professionalism of the lawyers in his office who, for the most part, were successful in defending
the Governor's policies.
249. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 96 cmt. d (2000).
250. See, e.g., Berenson, Hard Bargaining, supra note 220, at 362-365.
251. In this regard, the government lawyer acts similarly to the plaintiffs' lawyer in a class
action suit, long a preferred vehicle of cause lawyers. See, e.g., Bryant Garth, Power and Legal
Artifice: The Federal Class Action, 26 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 237,241 (1992).
252. See supra notes 22 and 186-88. Of course, in these cases the plaintiff was the government
lawyer acting in his official, rather than his personal capacity. The Chicago gun case, by contrast,
was brought in the name of the City of Chicago and the County of Cook. See Second Amended
Complaint 1 1, City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821 N.E.2d 1099 (Ill. 2005) (98 CH
015596).
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setts Professor Thomas M. Hilbink offers a useful typology for classify-
ing the various forms of cause lawyering.253 Hilbink classifies cause
lawyers into three broad categories: 1) proceduralist; 2) elite/vanguard;
and 3) grassroots.254 The distinctions between these categories, in turn,
are demarcated across three dimensions: a) the lawyers' vision of "the
system" within which they live and work; b) the lawyers' vision of the
cause for which they work; and c) the lawyers' vision of their job as law-
yers.255
Hilbink's first category is proceduralist lawyering. Proceduralists
view the legal and political systems within which they work as being
basically just.256 They view law and politics as being essentially sepa-
rate, with the former believed to be neutral and objective, rational and
predictable, and therefore superior to politics. 257 Because of their faith in
legal systems, as the name implies, proceduralist lawyers focus on pro-
cedural, rather than substantive, justice.258 As such, they are the cause
lawyers whose practices most resemble those of conventional lawyers.259
Not surprisingly, proceduralist lawyers' vision of their cause is similar to
their vision of the system. That is, they view their cause in procedural
terms.260 For example, for many legal services advocates during the
1960s, the right to counsel was viewed as an end in itself, rather than a
means to particular substantive goals. 26' Finally, with regard to the pro-
ceduralist lawyers' vision of their role, proceduralist lawyers accept a
traditional conception of the lawyer-client relationship. 262 Thus, the law-
yers' obligation to advance the particular interests of the client trump any
broader political, social, or economic goals of the lawyer or the broader
cause he or she may seek to serve.263 Thus, proceduralist cause lawyers
embrace the non-accountability principle discussed above.
A good example of proceduralist cause lawyering comes from law-
yers working with the American Bar Association (ABA) to represent
death row inmates. 264 Of course, the ABA is the most mainstream of
253. See Hilbink, Categories, supra note 3, at 657-61.
254. Id. at 664.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 665.
257. Id. (citing JUDITH N. SHKLAR, LEGALISM (1964)).
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 667.
261. Id. at 667-68 (citing John Kilwein, Still Trying: Cause Lawyering for the Poor and Dis-
advantaged in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, in Sarat & Scheingold, CAUSE LAWYERING, supra note 1,
at 183-84).
262. Id. at 672 & n.20.
263. Id. at 672. In some sense, as Hilbink points out, the broader cause of the proceduralist
lawyer is service to the legal system, and to the profession itself. Id. at 668 & n.15, 670 (quoting
Dotan, supra note 2, at 253).
264. See Austin Sarat, State Transformation and the Struggle for Symbolic Capital: Cause
Lawyers, the Organized Bar, and Capital Punishment in the United States, in Sarat & Scheingold,
GLOBAL ERA, supra note 1, at 189 [hereinafter Sarat, Capital Punishment].
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organizations that represent lawyers in America. In this instance, rather
than advancing substantive arguments as to the death penalty's invalidity
on either moral or constitutional grounds, the lawyers involved focused
on the procedural aspects of implementation of the death penalty in ad-
vancing their clients' interests, e.g., the availability of competent defense
lawyers for capital defendants and the availability of adequate opportuni-
ties for habeas corpus review of death penalty convictions. 65 Though
these lawyers undoubtedly served their clients' interests in avoiding ex-
ecution, the proceduralist approach had the corollary effects of legitimat-
ing both the State's death penalty apparatus (if implemented properly)
and the legal profession's paramount role in ensuring the legitimacy of
the legal system.266
The next category of cause lawyering identified by Hilbink is
elite/vanguard lawyering.267  In terms of their vision of the system,
elite/vanguard lawyers share proceduralist lawyers' vision of the legal
system as fundamentally just, and elite/vanguard lawyers work within the
context of the system rather than outside of it.268  However,
elite/vanguard lawyers reject proceduralist lawyers' sharp distinction
between law and politics. 269 Rather, elite/vanguard lawyers view lawyer-
ing as a form of politics, albeit a superior one to other forms such as di-
rect action.270 Also in contrast to proceduralists, elite/vanguard lawyers
are concerned about substantive, rather than procedural, justice. 27, What
matters is the outcome, not the legal means by which it is achieved.272
In terms of their vision of the cause, elite/vanguard lawyers embrace
the substance of the causes they represent.273 "Their goal is not to sup-
port professional values or the legal system, but to 'change policy, law,
and social systems in such a way that the status of marginalized groups'
is improved., 274 Not surprisingly then, in terms of their vision of the
lawyer's role, elite/vanguard lawyers reject the profession's non-
accountability tenet, 5 in favor of a strong identification with the ends
sought by the clients and causes they represent.2 76 Additionally, the tra-
265. Id. at 194-96; see also Hilbink, Categories, supra note 3, at 667.
266. Sarat, Capital Punishment, supra note 264, at 194-95, 200.
267. Hilbink, Categories, supra note 3, at 673.
268. Id. at 676 (citing Stuart Scheingold, Cause Lawyering and Democracy in Transnational
Perspective, in Sarat & Scheingold, GLOBAL ERA, supra note 1, and Ronen Shamir & Nita Ziv,
State-Oriented and Community-Oriented Lawyering for a Cause: A Tale of Two Strategies, in
GLOBAL ERA, supra note 1, at 298). The above description of "the system" includes legislative and
administrative forums in addition solely to courts. Id. at 677.
269. Id. at 673.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 674.
273. Id. at 675.
274. Id. (quoting Kilwein, supra note 261, at 189).
275. See supra notes 238-52 and accompanying text.
276. Hilbink, Categories, supra note 3, at 679.
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ditional agency relationship between attorney and client277 is practically
inverted in the case of elite/vanguard lawyering.278 Rather than doing the
bidding of clients who have sought out legal representation,
elite/vanguard lawyers often seek out particular clients and causes for
purposes of finding the litigants best situated to advance the goals sought
by the lawyers.279
Given elite/vanguard lawyers' reliance on formal legal systems to
effectuate social change, along with their view of lawyering as a type of
politics of superior means, it is not surprising that such lawyers place a
high value on the technical legal skills needed to achieve such results.28 °
Thus, the name elite/vanguard lawyering was chosen at least in part to
reflect the extraordinary skills of the lawyers who succeed through this
approach. Given the primacy of the lawyers within this approach, it is
not surprising that elite/vanguard lawyering reflects a "top down" ap-
proach, with lawyers often dictating appropriate strategies and tactics as
well as the substantive goals to be pursued.281
The legal campaigns of the NAACP and ACLU that were men-
tioned previously, 282 are perhaps the paradigmatic examples of
elite/vanguard lawyering. With regard to the NAACP's legal campaign
to end segregated schools, lawyers pursued a campaign of litigation with-
in the courts, rejecting direct action such as sit-ins and boycotts.283 The
NAACP lawyers recruited plaintiffs for their cases based on the parties'
ability best to represent the legal claims the lawyers sought to advance.284
The lawyers then litigated the cases in the manner the lawyers thought
best for the broader cause of desegregation (which the lawyers, of
course, wholeheartedly embraced), even where doing so may have been
in tension with the individual interests of the clients being represented in
a particular suit.285 Of course, lead lawyers Thurgood Marshall, Charles
Hamilton Houston, and others would become revered figures within the
legal profession.
The final category of cause lawyering identified by Hilbink is gras-
sroots lawyering. 286 Grassroots lawyers have a different vision of the
legal system than lawyers in the previous two categories addressed.
Grassroots lawyers reject the fundamental fairness of the legal system.
277. See supra notes 262-63 and accompanying text.
278. Hilbink, Categories, supra note 3, at 679.
279. Id. at 679-80.
280. Id. at 678 (citing MICHAEL W. MCCANN, TAKING REFORM SERIOUSLY: PERSPECTIVES ON
PUBLIC INTEREST LIBERALISM 26 (1986)).
281. Id. at 677, 683.
282. See supra notes 211-12 and accompanying text.
283. Hilbink, Categories, supra note 3, at 676.
284. Id. at 681.
285. Id. at 680; see also Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and
Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 471 (1976).
286. Hilbink, Categories, supra note 3, at 681.
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Rather, they view the legal system as, at best, ineffective in terms of
achieving justice for their clients, or, at worst, overtly hostile or corrupt
with regard to their clients' interests.287 Because of this view, grassroots
lawyers often seek extra-legal means in order to advance their objec-
288tives. In terms of their vision of the cause, grassroots lawyers do em-
brace the social change objectives of the clients they work with.289 How-
ever, because legal approaches, such as litigation, are disfavored within
grassroots lawyering, the particular skills of lawyers are less valuable
and valued within this type of cause lawyering. 290 This fact has implica-
tions for grassroots lawyers' vision of the lawyer's role as well. Because
lawyers' skills are less important to the approaches undertaken in gras-
sroots lawyering, lawyers play less of a primary and more of a subordi-
nate role in the representation. Rather than the "top down" style of la-
wyering prevalent in elite/vanguard representation, grassroots lawyering
is "bottom up." Grassroots lawyers collaborate with and assist based
movements working for social change, often playing a subordinate, ra-
ther than a directive role.
When one looks at the government lawyer campaigns discussed
above in relation to Hilbink's typology, it becomes clear that these cam-
paigns fit rather neatly into Hilbink's elite/vanguard lawyering category.
First, not surprisingly, the elected and appointed government lawyers
who initiated the legal campaigns view the legal system as fundamentally
just and efficacious, and it is similarly not surprising that they targeted
their reform efforts at the courts, rather than utilizing other means. 29'
Second, it is also understandable why these individuals who at the same
time served as lawyers and as public officials would reject a sharp dis-
tinction between law and politics. Indeed, these officials' professional
existence is itself evidence of a blurred distinction between law and poli-
tics.
In terms of their view of the cause, the lawyers profiled above each
embraced an explicit social change orientation with the campaigns they
initiated. As stated above, the lead lawyers involved in each were at the
very highest reaches of the legal profession in terms of status. While
earlier this was offered as a tension with the outsider status of many
cause lawyers,292 it fits perfectly with Hilbink's description of the role of
287. Id.
288. Id. at 685.
289. Id. at 683.
290. Id. at 688 (citing Stuart Scheingold, The Struggle to Politicize Legal Practice: Left-
Activist Lawyering in Seattle, in Sarat & Scheingold, CAUSE LAWYERING, supra note 1, at 125). In
reality, cause lawyers divide less neatly than Hilbink's categories would suggest. For example, Scott
Cummings contends that many grassroots lawyers are less reluctant to pursue legal remedies, partic-
ularly in conjunction with other approaches, than Hilbink argues. Scott L. Cummings, Critical Legal
Consciousness in Action, 120 HARV. L. REV. F. 62 (2007).
291. See supra notes 27, 101, 154 and accompanying text.
292. See supra notes 228-33 and accompanying text.
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lawyers within elite/vanguard lawyering. Additionally, with regard to
the vision of the lawyer's role in the cases discussed above, given the
amorphous nature of the "clients" represented in the government lawyer
cases, 293 it seems clear that the campaigns took on a lawyer-centric ap-
proach similar to that of the classic elite/vanguard lawyering representa-
tions addressed here.294
3. Sarat and Scheingold's Typology
Similarly to Hilbink, Sarat and Scheingold have offered their own
typology of the cause lawyering examples discussed in their collec-
295 layrtions. Cause lawyers are broadly divided into those who work in sup-
port of liberal democracy, 296 and those who work against it.297 Within
the category of cause lawyers who work in support of liberal democracy,
Sarat and Scheingold identify three subcategories: 1) neoliberal lawyers;
2) libertarian lawyers; and 3) left liberal lawyers. 298 Neoliberal lawyers
primarily work "to defend and extend property rights in order to transfer
'power from government regulators to landowners and entrepre-
neurs. ' 99 They often work in the areas of tort reform, environmental
regulation, and land use planning.3°° Well-known organizations that fall
into this category include the Pacific Legal Foundation, the Manhattan
Institute, and the Mountain States Legal Foundation.3 1
Libertarian lawyers, by contrast, "look beyond property rights and
the protection of business interests to individual liberties in the social and
cultural spheres. 30 2 Libertarian cause lawyers work in areas such as
school choice, welfare reform, and interracial adoptions, while support-
ing decriminalization for "victimless" crimes such as drug use and por-
nography.
30 3
Left liberal cause lawyers, in turn, seek to "defend the public, as
well as the private, [first generation] rights of individuals. ' 3 ° 4 Thus, such
293. See supra notes 262-63, 275-79, 287-89 and accompanying text.
294. See supra notes 275-79 and accompanying text.
295. SCHEINGOLD & SARAT, SOMETHING TO BELIEVE, supra note 1, at 101.
296. Id. at 107.
297. Id. at 113. Sarat and Scheingold identify liberal democracy in conjunction with represent-
ative government, the rule of law, individual rights, and an autonomous, open, and pluralistic civil
society. Id. at 102. The individual rights recognized in such regimes are civil and political, of the
type enshrined in the Bill of Rights to the U.S. Constitution, as opposed to the social and economic
rights, which are recognized in social democratic alternatives to liberal democracy. Id. at 102-04.
Sarat and Scheingold refer to the former category of rights as "first generation" rights, and the latter
category as "second generation" rights. Id. at 102-103.
298. Id. at 102.
299. Id. at 108 (quoting John P. Heinz, Anthony Paik & Anne Southworth, Lawyers for Con-




303. Id. at 109.
304. Id. at 110. See supra note 290 for a description of first generation and second generation
rights.
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lawyers seek to encourage "a robust and inclusive form of political and
social citizenship," as opposed to a broad sphere of negative liberty from
government interference, as is the case with regard to neoliberal and li-
bertarian cause lawyers.3 °5 Of course, the ACLU is the paradigmatic left
liberal cause law firm in America.306 However, in addition to the sexual
freedom, free speech, and electoral accountability cases that the ACLU is
known for, other left liberal cause lawyers focus on issues such as immi-
gration reform, the death penalty, police violence, employment discrimi-
nation, the right to die, tenants rights, and abortion rights.30 The primary
difference between these lawyers and lawyers on the left who work
against liberal democracy, and who will be discussed below, is their ba-
sic stance toward "the system, ',' 308 to echo Hilbink's typology from
above.3° While these left liberal lawyers work to achieve social change
within the bounds of the existing legal system, the lawyers discussed
below work to change the system itself.
310
Within the category of cause lawyers who work against liberal de-
mocracy, Sarat and Scheingold identify three additional subcategories: 1)
evangelical democratic; 2) social democratic; and 3) emancipatory dem-
ocratic.311 Evangelical democratic cause lawyers work defensively to use
first generation negative liberty rights to carve out a broad space for reli-
312gious expression. However, evangelical democratic lawyers also work
"offensively" to seek a radical transformation of the liberal democratic
society toward a theocratic society.313 Social democratic cause lawyers,
in turn, also seek to transform the liberal democratic state, this time in
the direction of a more inclusive and egalitarian distribution of wealth,
and an orientation toward equality of outcomes, rather than equality of
opportunity, which is at least a formal hallmark of the liberal democratic
state.314 And while emancipatory democratic cause lawyers agree with
the ends sought by social democratic cause lawyers, they differ as to the
means that should be used to achieve those ends. For example, social
democratic cause lawyers are more favorably inclined toward the state
than their emancipatory counterparts, who mistrust the state and seek
broad diffusion of power and political participation.31 5
305. Id. (citing DANIEL C. KRAMER, PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY: DEVELOPING IDEALS OF
THE POLITICAL LEFT (1972).
306. Id.
307. Id. (citing MICHAEL J. KELLY, LIVES OF LAWYERS: JOURNEYS IN THE ORGANIZATION OF
PRACTICE 145-63 (1994).
308. Id. at 111 (quoting Scheingold & Bloom, Politicization, supra note 224, at 230).
309. See supra notes 253-294 and accompanying text.
310. SCHEINGOLD & SARAT, SOMETHING TO BELIEVE, supra note I, at 111, 113.
311. Id. at 102.
312. Id. at 115.
313. Id. at 116.
314. Id. at 103,113
315. Id. at 113,121.
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Naturally, within the major division between those cause lawyers
who work in favor of liberal democracy and those who work against it,
the government lawyers profiled above fall within the group working for
liberal democracy. After all, these are elected and appointed officers of
the state we are talking about.316 Moreover, each of the cases discussed
above falls on the left hand side of the political spectrum. Thus, it would
appear that within Sarat and Scheingold's typology, the government law-
yers discussed above would be characterized as left-liberal cause lawyers
working in favor of liberal democracy.
Because Sarat and Scheingold's typology offers more categories
than Hilbink's, it perhaps better reflects the complex realities of the
world of practice than the latter. Nonetheless, this complexity limits the
effectiveness of Sarat and Scheingold's typology as a heuristic device.
Therefore, the balance of this paper will focus on Hilbink's typology, as
opposed to that of Sarat and Scheingold.
C. Government Lawyer as Cause Lawyer-Conclusion
Based upon the foregoing discussion, the conclusion here is that the
three government legal campaigns described above should be considered
examples of cause lawyering. It is true that the lawyers involved in these
cases did not always act in the role of cause lawyer and lacked the out-
sider status that is a hallmark of cause lawyers. Yet, as pointed out
above, many cause lawyers do not operate as such at all times, and the
high level of professional status enjoyed by the lawyers involved here is
consistent with that attained by Hilbink's elite/vanguard lawyers, who
have sometimes become icons within the legal profession as a result of
their social change oriented lawyering. Also similar to Hilbink's
elite/vanguard lawyers, the lawyers in the cases discussed here both
blurred the line between law and politics and rejected the profession's
non-accountability tenet in conjunction with these cases. Rather, the
lawyers involved embraced as their own the substantive causes of tobac-
co and gun control or investment research analyst independence. There-
fore, the three campaigns discussed above may appropriately be de-
scribed as examples of elite/vanguard cause lawyering. Given this con-
clusion, it is this author's hope that some social change oriented lawyers
will consider government service as an appropriate professional path to
take in which to pursue their objectives.
316. Note however that Scheingold & Sarat characterize the private personal injury lawyers
who worked as co-counsel in some of the above-described matter as social democratic transforma-
tive cause lawyers, given the manner in which they use the courts to attack the abuse of corporate
and private power against the interests of individual citizens. Id. at 119-20; see also Tim Howard,
Cause Lawyers and Cracker Culture at the Constructive Edge: A "Band of Brothers" Defeats Big
Tobacco, in Sarat & Scheingold, CULTURAL LIVES, supra note 1, at 79.
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I. CAN GOVERNMENT CAUSE LAWYERS TRANSCEND THE LIMITATIONS
THAT CONSTRAIN THE EFFECTIVENESS OF OTHER CAUSE LAWYERS?
Having determined that the lawyers involved in the government le-
gal campaigns addressed in Part I may appropriately be characterized as
cause lawyers within that context, the next question to be addressed is
whether such government lawyers can act effectively in that role.
A. Two Approaches to Evaluating Cause Lawyer Effectiveness
The following section summarizes two broad approaches to evaluat-
ing the effectiveness of cause lawyering efforts. The first, which is ex-
emplified by Professor Gerald N. Rosenberg's book The Hollow Hope:
Can Courts Bring About Social Change?,317 is described here as the ac-
tuarial approach. The other, which is exemplified by the work of politi-
cal science Professor Michael McCann, is described here as the cultural
approach.
1. The Actuarial Approach: The Hollow Hope
The starting point for an assessment of the effectiveness of the legal
campaigns discussed above should be Professor Gerald N. Rosenberg's
seminal work, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social
Change ?318 In The Hollow Hope, Rosenberg challenges conventional
wisdom regarding the effectiveness of the type of litigation campaigns
described by Hilbink as elite/vanguard lawyering.319 For example, Ro-
senberg questions the effectiveness of the NAACP's legal challenge to
segregated schools which resulted in the U.S. Supreme Court decision in
Brown v. Board of Education.320 He similarly questions the effectiveness
of the campaign for abortion rights that led to the decision in Roe v.
Wade.321 And, in the recently-released second edition of the book,
322
Rosenberg challenges the effectiveness of the campaign for same-sex
marriage rights that culminated in the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court decision in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health.323
317. Supra note 14.
318. Id.
319. See supra notes 267-285 and accompanying text.
320. 349 U.S. 294 (1955); see ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE, supra note 14, at 42-169;
Gerald N. Rosenberg, Courting Disaster: Looking for Change in All the Wrong Places, 54 DRAKE
L. REv. 795, 809 (2006) [hereinafter Rosenberg, Courting Disaster]; Gerald N. Rosenberg, Substitut-
ing Symbol for Substance: What Did Brown Really Accomplish?, 37 PS: POL. SC. & POL. 205
(2004) [hereinafter Rosenberg, Substituting Symbol].
321. 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE, supra note 14, at 175-201;
Rosenberg, Courting Disaster, supra note 320, at 810; Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Real World of
Constitutional Rights: The Supreme Court and the Implementation of the Abortion Decisions, in
CONTEMPLATING COURTS 390 (Lee Epstein ed., 1995).
322. Supra note 14.
323. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003); see ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE 2, supra note 14, at
339-419; Rosenberg, Courting Disaster, supra note 320, at 812.
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Rosenberg's methodology is largely quantitative-he analyzes large
amounts of data of various types to try to measure the effect of these
landmark court decisions. For example, with regard to Brown's effec-
tiveness, he points to data showing that even a decade after Brown, al-
most 99% of African-American children in the eleven states of the for-
mer confederacy still attended segregated schools.324 And, with regard to
Roe, Rosenberg points out that the rate of increase in abortions in Ameri-
ca actually slowed following the Supreme Court's decision.325
Rosenberg's analysis may not be precisely on point for purposes of
our discussion. Rosenberg's primary focus in the book is the inability of
courts, acting on their own, to foster progressive social change, rather
than the lawyers who appear before them.326 Rosenberg explains this
inability on a number of grounds. First, Rosenberg points out that
throughout their history, with the possible exception of a couple of dec-
ades during the middle of the twentieth century, American courts have
been opponents, rather than supporters, of progressive social change, and
that courts have been defenders of, rather than challengers to, the eco-
327nomic, political, and social status quo. Second, Rosenberg offers four
explanations for why this is so. The federal judicial appointments
process, particularly as it relates to Supreme Court Justices, requires
broad acceptability on the part of judicial appointees.328 Thus, progres-
sive social reformers are unlikely to be appointed to the federal bench.329
Next, the Constitution itself is a constraint on liberal social reform, with
its recognition of first generation political and civil rights, to use Sarat
and Scheingold's terminology discussed above,33 0 and with its failure to
recognize economic, social, and cultural rights,331 which might alter the
presently existing balance of wealth and power in society. Additionally,
courts are constrained from pushing too far ahead of the other branches
of government in introducing reforms, because courts need the assistance
of the other branches to implement and enforce court decisions.332 And
finally, courts themselves lack the power to implement and enforce their
own decisions.33 3
324. Rosenberg, Courting Disaster, supra note 320, at 809 (citing Rosenberg, Substituting
Symbol, supra note 320, at 205).
325. Id. at 810. To be fair, it is hard to image that the goal of abortion rights advocates was an
increase in the number of abortions performed.
326. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE, supra note 14, at 1.
327. Rosenberg, Courting Disaster, supra note 320, at 797. Rosenberg discusses Supreme
Court decisions in areas including civil rights, id., civil liberties and dissident speech, id. at 802, and
economic regulation, id. at 806, to illustrate his point.
328. Id. at 808.
329. Id.
330. See supra notes 295-316 and accompanying text.
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Though courts may be the primary focus of Rosenberg's critique, he
does not spare from his ire what he would describe as the nalve cause
lawyers who over-rely on litigation as a means to achieve their goals.
Not only are such lawyers misguided in their belief in litigation's ability
to achieve social reforms, but they also, in his view, harm the very causes
they champion by pursuing litigation as a means. First, resorting to the
courts tends to replace the building of social movements and the kind of
community support that Rosenberg believes is crucial to achieving and
sustaining progressive social reform.334 Second, court decisions in favor
of progressive reformers may result in mobilization of opposition forces
which can have the effect of preventing successful implementation of the
court decision. For example, Rosenberg points to massive popular resis-
tance in the South to forced desegregation following the Brown decision
as hindering, rather than helping, the cause of desegregation. 335 And,
Rosenberg similarly points to Roe v. Wade as leading to the rise of the
"right to life" movement in the United States, which has so vigorously
opposed abortion and abortion rights over the past three decades.336 The
fact that numerous states passed either statutes or constitutional amend-
ments banning same-sex marriage in the immediate aftermath of Goo-
dridge provides further support for Rosenberg's "backlash" thesis.
3 37
Note that Rosenberg suggests that conservative activists may have an
easier time achieving success through social change oriented litigation
than liberal or progressive activists.33  That is because conservatives
generally ask courts to preserve the status quo, or to dismantle precedents
that were achieved during the brief reign of progressive judicial decision-
making during the mid-twentieth century, each of which courts are more
inclined to do than to effectuate liberal social change.339 In any event,
Rosenberg contends that progressive social reformers would do well to
avoid resorting to courts alone and to seek other avenues to pursue their
social change objectives.
2. The Cultural Approach: Michael McCann
Despite the force of his arguments, critics have contended that Ro-
senberg's analysis fails to apprehend at least some benefits that may be
associated with social reform litigation. More particularly, these critics
suggest that litigation may have impacts that go beyond the outcome of
particular cases, and that Rosenberg's quantitative approach may miss
334. Id. at 796-97.
335. Id. at 809; Rosenberg, Substituting Symbol, supra note 320, at 207.
336. Rosenberg, Courting Disaster, supra note 320, at 811.
337. Id. at 812-13. Note that Rosenberg's writings regarding Goodridge predate the decision
of the California Supreme Court similarly recognizing a right to same-sex marriage under the Cali-
fornia Constitution. See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008).
338. Rosenberg, Courting Disaster, supra note 320, at 814.
339. Id.
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some of the qualitative impacts litigation may have in shaping social
consciousness and social practices.34 °
Perhaps the most persistent of Rosenberg's critics has been Michael
McCann, a professor of political science at the University of Washing-
ton.341 McCann suggests that Rosenberg's court-centered, "top-down"
view of social change through law fails to capture the entirety of what is
provided by adding a de-centered, 342 "bottom-up" approach to analyzing
social change through law. The latter approach recognizes that very few
disputes are actually resolved by courts, and that very few actors who are
influenced by, and implement, legal decisions are in fact bound by, or
participants in, the actual case itself.343 Thus, the interpretations com-
munities attach to legal decisions become more important than the actual
decisions themselves. As stated by McCann:
[T]he decentered view emphasizes that judicially articulated legal
norms take on a life of their own as they are deployed in practical so-
cial action. This points to what many analysts refer to as the consti-
tutive capacity of law: Legal knowledge prefigures in part the sym-
bolic terms of material relations and becomes a potential resource in
ongoing struggles to refigure those relations.
344
Thus, what appears on the face of a judicial decision to be a defeat
for the legal reformers who brought the suit might turn out to be some-
thing entirely different in practice. A good example of this comes from
McCann's own research regarding the pay equity movement.345 McCann
points out that many of the arguments advanced by pay equity advocates
were not ultimately accepted by courts.346 However, what appeared to be
litigation defeats were utilized by pay equity advocates including unions
and feminist groups to organize and mobilize grassroots support for their
claims.347 This support helped pave the way for legislation in support of
pay equity.348 Moreover, lawsuits were used to create leverage for col-
lective bargaining and other agreements between unions, employees, and
340. See, e.g., Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and
Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373, 394-95 (citing Paul Schiff Berman, The Cultural Life of
Capital Punishment: Surveying the Benefits of a Cultural Analysis of Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV.
1129, 1140 (2002) and Austin D. Sarat, Redirecting Legal Scholarship in Law Schools, 12 YALE J.L.
& HUMAN. 129, 134 (2000)).
341. See supra note 17.
342. McCann, Reform Litigation, supra note 17, at 730.
343. Id. at 730-33.
344. Id. at 733.
345. See, e.g., MICHAEL W. MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY REFORM AND THE
POLITICS OF LEGAL MOBILIZATION (1994).
346. See SCHEINGOLD & SARAT, SOMETHING TO BELIEVE, supra note 1, at 119; McCann,
Reform Litigation, supra note 17, at 737-38.
347. McCann, Reform Litigation, supra note 17, at 738.
348. See id. at 738-39.
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employers that led to greater advances in pay equity than either the law-
suits or negotiations alone could have led to.
34 9
McCann identifies four different axes along which his approach to
analyzing the effectiveness of law reform tactics differs from that of Ro-
senberg's. The first has to do with the symbolic power of the law.
350
While Rosenberg essentially views legal arguments as either being suc-
cessful or unsuccessful in court, McCann suggests that even an "unsuc-
cessful" legal argument may have important symbolic value beyond its
acceptance or non-acceptance in court.35' The next difference has to do
with causality and power.352 Rosenberg views causality and power in a
linear fashion, measuring for a direct link between judicial action and
discernable impacts in the social world.353 McCann, by contrast, views
causality and power multi-directionally, with the impacts of judicial de-
cisions flowing back and forth in many different directions, with many
different, often difficult to discern effects.354 The third axis of difference
has to do with research methods. 355 While Rosenberg focuses on aggre-
gate, quantifiable data, McCann focuses on more qualitative analysis,
usually in the form of detailed case studies of narrowly targeted popula-
tions or institutional venues.356 The final axis of difference has to do
with the scholars' definitions of what constitutes "significant" social
change.357 Rosenberg views significant social change in terms of based,
national, statistically measurable changes in official policies.358
McCann, by contrast, contends that significant social change may be
episodic, uneven, and difficult or impossible to measure.359
In fairness, both Rosenberg and McCann concede that their varying
approaches may "argue past" each other, rather than colliding head-on.360
As mentioned above, Rosenberg's focus is on nationally-based, large-
scaled social reform movements that culminated with decisions from the
United States or State Supreme Courts. 36 1 Given this broad lens, it
makes sense that Rosenberg would focus on aggregate and quantifiable
measures of litigation success. By contrast, McCann's focus is much
narrower, on small-scaled and local efforts at social reform through
law.362 In such circumstances, it makes sense that the more qualitative
349. Id.






356. Id. at 741-42.
357. Id. at 742.
358. Id.
359. Id.
360. See id. at 720; Gerald N. Rosenberg, Hollow Hopes and Other Aspirations: A Reply to
Feely and McCann, 17 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 761,777 (1992).
361. See supra notes 320-25, 335-37 and accompanying text.
362. See supra notes 347-49, 356 and accompanying text.
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measures of effectiveness advocated by McCann would do a better job of
capturing complex realities than the approach advocated by Rosenberg.
Extending this analysis to our earlier discussion of typologies of
cause lawyering, it may well be the case that Rosenberg's actuarial ap-
proach does a better job of measuring the effectiveness of the type of
cause lawyering identified by Hilbink as elite/vanguard lawyering 363 than
McCann's cultural approach, given the broad scale of most
elite/vanguard lawyering campaigns. Because such campaigns aspire to
nationally recognizable impacts, the broad and aggregate measures em-
ployed by Rosenberg may be the most accurate measures of the refor-
mers' success or failure in achieving their broad goals. On the other
hand, McCann's cultural approach may do a better job of capturing the
effects of what Hilbink describes as grassroots lawyering, 6 or what Sa-
rat and Scheingold describe as lawyering against liberal democracy,365
than Rosenberg's broader-based, more quantitative approach. Because
the goals of such grassroots legal reformers are local and small-scaled,
the aggregate measures utilized by Rosenberg may fail to identify suc-
cesses achieved by such reformers. By contrast, McCann's narrower
focus and qualitative methods may identify such successes where Rosen-
berg's methods cannot. Indeed, Hilbink has insightfully pointed out that
the very limitations Rosenberg has identified regarding the effectiveness
of elite/vanguard lawyering have driven increasing numbers of cause
lawyers to move in the direction of grassroots, rather than elite/vanguard,
approaches.366
For present purposes, because the government legal campaigns that
are the focus here fall within the category of elite/vanguard lawyering, it
may well be the case that Rosenberg's aggregate approach offers a more
promising avenue through which to assess the effectiveness of the cam-
paigns than McCann's constitutive approach. Nonetheless, in the inter-
ests of thoroughness, the following section of the paper will attempt to
evaluate the effectiveness of the three litigation campaigns under discus-
sion here utilizing elements from both Rosenberg's actuarial approach
and McCann's cultural one.
B. Evaluating the Government Cause Lawyer Cases Under the Two Dif-
ferent Approaches
The following section attempts briefly to evaluate each of the cases
studied here utilizing both an actuarial and a cultural approach. We be-
gin with an assessment of the Mississippi tobacco case from an actuarial
perspective. Assuming a correlation could be proven, the most important
363. See supra notes 267-85 and accompanying text.
364. See supra notes 286-90 and accompanying text.
365. See supra notes 311-15 and accompanying text.
366. See Thomas Hilbink, The Profession, The Grassroots, and the Elite, in SARAT &
SCHEINGOLD, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, supra note 1, at 63.
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positive impact of the Mississippi tobacco case would be a reduction in
smoking rates. And indeed nationally, smoking rates among adults did
decline significantly during the years immediately following execution of
the MSA. In 1997, overall smoking prevalence in the United States
among adults was 24.7%.367 By 2004, that rate had declined to 20.9%.368
The number has been relatively stable since then, measured at 20.8% in
2006.369 The reduction in youth smoking, which was a major target of
those who brought the suit,370 was even more dramatic. Use of tobacco
by high school students nationally declined from 36.4% to 23% from
1997 through 2005. 37 1 Within Mississippi itself, there was a similar de-
cline in youth tobacco use during the relevant period.372 On the other
hand, adult tobacco use in Mississippi did not decline subsequent to ex-
ecution of the MSA.37 3 Of course, as will be discussed below, many fac-
tors beyond the tobacco lawsuit may have contributed to these figures.
Probably the most direct relationship that can be claimed between
the litigation and the decline in smoking rates has to do with the econom-
ic impact of the settlement. Though this impact was significantly re-
duced given the eventual settlement of $206 billion as opposed to the
original $368 billion agreed upon, the economic impact was nonetheless
noticeable. Most experts attribute about a forty to forty-five cent per
pack increase in the price of cigarettes to the MSA.374 Given established
figures relating to the price elasticity of cigarette sales,375 it is possible to
attribute most of the reduction in cigarette use to the price increase re-
sulting from the MSA. Of course some of the money from the tobacco
367. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Cigarette Smoking Among Adults-United




370. See supra notes 25, 81 and accompanying text.
371. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Cigarette Use Among High School Stu-
dents-United States, 1991-2005, 55 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 724, 725 (2006),
available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/PDF/wk/mm5526.pdf.
372. See OFFICE OF HEALTH DATA AND RESEARCH, MISS. STATE DEP'T OF HEALTH, TOBACCO
USE TREND AMONG MISSISSIPPI YOUTH: FINDINGS FROM THE 1998 TO 2006 YOUTH TOBACCO
SURVEY 1 (2008), available at
http://www.health.ms.gov/msdhsite/index.cfnm31,2557,303,pdf/YTSTobaccoTrends 1998-2006.pdf
(current tobacco use among Mississippi high school students declined from 30.3% in 1998 to 18.7%
in 2006).
373. The adult smoking rate in Mississippi in 1997 was 23.2%. Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention, State-Specific Prevalence Among Adults of Current Cigarette Smoking and Smoke-
less Tobacco Use and Per Capita Tax-Paid Sales of Cigarettes - United States, 1997, 47
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 922, 923 tbl.l (1998), available at
ftp://ftp.cdc.gov/pub/Publications/mmwr/wk/mm4743.pdf. In 2005, that figure was 25.1%. Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention, State-Specific Prevalence of Cigarette Smoking Among Adults
and Quitting Among Persons Aged 18-35 Years-United States, 2006,56 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY
WKLY. REP. 993,994 tbl. 1 (2007), available at http://www.cdc.gov/MMWR/PDF/wk/mm5638.pdf.
374. See Schroeder, supra note 79, at 295; see also F A Sloan, C A Matthews & J G Trogdon,
Impacts of the Master Settlement Agreement on the tobacco industry, 13 TOBACCO CONTROL 356,
359 (2004) [hereinafter Sloan, Impacts] (citing W. KIP VISCUSI, SMOKE-FILLED ROOMS 18 (2002)).
375. Schroeder states that for every 10% increase in the price of cigarettes there is about a four
percent decrease in demand. Schroeder, supra note 79, at 295.
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settlement went to fund an unprecedented level of smoking cessation
programs, 376 as well as to fund counter-advertisements by the American
Legacy Foundation against tobacco use.377 On the other hand, states
have found it increasingly difficult to avoid the temptation of utilizing
the tobacco settlement funds allocated to them for purposes other than
tobacco control.378 Also, while the main purpose of the initiators of the
litigation was not necessarily to punish the tobacco companies, it at least
seems incongruous that the tobacco parties to the settlement have flou-
rished financially following the settlement.379 This result is certainly not
consistent with the rhetoric of the government attorneys during the
course of the tobacco suits vilifying the tobacco defendants.
Next, we turn to an analysis of the results of the tobacco case from a
cultural perspective. It would seem that the state tobacco lawsuits at
least in some ways contributed to building the public narrative that de-
veloped around the time of the lawsuits demonizing the tobacco industry
and isolating smokers within society. However, that narrative had been
developing since at least the 1950s, with major contributions coming
from the Surgeon General's landmark 1964 Report,380 and a spate of lo-
cal regulations banning smoking in public places and limiting the sale of
cigarettes to minors.38' Closer to the present, media coverage, including
the Day One report discussed above,382 contributed much to increase
public awareness of nicotine addiction, as well as the lengths gone to by
the tobacco industry to obfuscate both nicotine's addictiveness and the
other health harms caused by smoking.383 Many of the documents which
demonstrate the industry's efforts to conceal the harmful effects of smok-
ing were disclosed by whistleblowers independent of the states' lawsuits,
though certainly some documents were brought to light through the liti-
gation that would not otherwise have become available.384 Further, it
seems clear that it was the weight of the possibility of lawsuits brought
by all fifty states that brought big tobacco to the negotiating table for the
first time in its history.
385
Critics of the tobacco settlement have suggested that it will have
negative impacts of a qualitative nature that will far outweigh any posi-
376. A recently released study shows a positive correlation between expenditures on state anti-
tobacco programs and declines in smoking prevalence. See Matthew C. Farrelly, Terry W. Pecha-
cek, Kristin Y. Thomas & David Nelson, The Impact of Tobacco Control Programs on Adult Smok-
ing, 98 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 304,304 (2008).
377. Sloan, Impacts, supra note 374, at 356; see also Schroeder, supra note 79, at 294. Fund-
ing for the American Legacy Foundation expired five years after the settlement. Id.
378. Id. at 294-95.
379. See, e.g., Sloan, Impacts, supra note 374, at 356.
380. Robert L. Rabin, The Tobacco Litigation: A Tentative Assessment, 51 DePaul L. Rev.
331, 352 (2001) [hereinafter Rabin, Tentative Assessment].
381. Id. at 350.
382. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
383. Rabin, Tentative Assessment, supra note 380, at 352-53
384. Id.
385. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
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tive ones. Some theorists have suggested that the MSA sets a dangerous
precedent from a constitutional law perspective, violating core principles
of separation of powers and amounting to "regulation through litiga-
tion." Others have been particularly critical of the use of contingent
fee arrangements with private attorneys in order to bring such large scale,
social reform lawsuits.387 While it is too early to determine whether such
harms, which would likely only be discernable over long periods of time,
have ensued, it is worth noting that the flood of "copycat" lawsuits antic-
ipated by critics of the tobacco litigation, against industries ranging from
fast food, to lead paint, to health care, have largely failed to material-
ize.
388
It is also possible to evaluate the effectiveness of the Chicago gun
case from an actuarial perspective. Looking at the Chicago gun case
from a similar point of view as that applied to the tobacco case above,
perhaps the best quantitative measure of success of the gun lawsuits
would be a reduction in gun violence. As mentioned above, the number
of gun homicides nationally declined in the two years immediately fol-
lowing the filing of the Chicago suit. 389 However, that was a continua-
tion of a steep decline that had begun years prior to the filing of the Chi-
cago suit, and that leveled off beginning in 2000.390 In Chicago itself,
gun homicides did decline in the year following the suit, but then began
to creep back upwards.39' In any event, it would be extremely hard to tie
any decrease in handgun violence, either nationally, or in Chicago par-
ticularly, to a lawsuit that was wholly unsuccessful from a legal perspec-
tive. Indeed, the broad academic consensus seems to be that the gun
lawsuits as a whole were similarly unsuccessful.392
386. E.g., W. Kip Viscusi, Overview to REGULATION THROUGH LITIGATION 1,7 (W. Kip Vis-
cusi ed., 2002); Michael E. DeBow, The State Tobacco Litigation and Separation of Powers in State
Governments: Repairing the Damage, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 563, 563-65 (2001); Margaret A.
Little, A Most Dangerous Indiscretion: The Legal, Economic, and Political Legacy of the Govern-
ments' Tobacco Litigation, 33 CONN. L. REV. 1143, 1143-44 (2001); Jonathan Turley, A Crisis of
Faith: Tobacco and the Madisonian Democracy, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 433,449-50 (2000).
387. E.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., "When Smoke Gets in Your Eyes": Myth and Reality About the
Synthesis of Private Counsel and Public Client, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 241, 252 (2001); David A.
Dana, Public Interest and Private Lawyers: Toward a Normative Evaluation of Parens Patriae
Litigation by Contingent Fee, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 315, 323 (2001); Little, supra note 386, at 1183.
388. Indeed, on July 1, 2008, the Rhode Island Supreme Court reversed a jury verdict in favor
of the State of Rhode Island against manufacturers of lead paint and dismissed the State's public
nuisance case against the industry. See State v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 951 A.2d 428, 434-35 (R.I.
2008).
389. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
390. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
391. In 1999, gun homicides in Chicago numbered 460, down from 569 in 1997 and 536 in
1998. RESEARCH & DEV. DIVISION, CHICAGO POLICE DEPT., CRIME SUMMARY-CHICAGO 2003,
http://egov.cityofchicago.org/webportal/COCWebPortal/COC-EDTORIAL/03YEHomicide-I .pdf
(last visited Jan. 12, 2009). However, in 2000, the number climbed to 472 and to 514 in 2001. Id.
392. See Allen Rostron, Lawyers, Guns, & Money: The Rise and Fall of Tort Litigation
Against the Firearms Industry, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 481, 486 & n.31, 487 (2006) (reviewing
SUING THE GUN INDUSTRY, supra note 28) (citing authorities). However, Rostron himself chal-
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Furthermore, the gun litigation seems to offer a vivid illustration of
Rosenberg's backlash thesis.393 The gun lawsuits appear to have brought
together a new alliance between the NRA and the gun manufacturers
themselves that had not previously existed.394 The result was both state
and federal legislation that dramatically reduced the likelihood of suc-
cessful lawsuits against the gun industry in the future.395 Additionally,
the Supreme Court's ruling in Heller396 seems likely to significantly in-
hibit further efforts of gun control advocates.
The gun cases were not much more successful from a cultural pers-
pective than from an actuarial perspective. On the one hand, the cases
did go a long way toward publicizing the marketing and distribution
practices of gun manufacturers that seemed to increase the likelihood that
guns would fall into the hands of those who would use them illegally.397
However, gun control advocates seem to have had only limited success
in leveraging the legal arguments rejected in the Chicago case into gains
in other forums. Indeed, at least as much momentum for the cause of
gun control came from highly publicized shootings such as those at Co-
lumbine High School,398 and from their aftermath, 399 as from the gun
litigation. In the end, the country remains deeply polarized over its
views regarding firearms,4°° in sharp contrast to the emerging consensus
against tobacco.4°'
In terms of actuarial measures of success, the results of the New
York Attorney General's case against Merrill Lynch fall somewhere be-
tween those of the tobacco and gun cases. Though the $100 million pe-
nalty paid by Merrill is nothing to sneeze at, it was, of course, minute as
compared to the tobacco settlement. It also amounted to little more than
a slap on the wrist given the capitalization of Merrill Lynch, and critics
have pointed out that none of the money went directly to reimburse in-
vestors who were harmed by Merrill's tainted research information.4 2
In addition to the monetary aspect of the Merrill Lynch settlement,
the company did agree to a number of reforms that resulted in a separa-
lenges this view, and attributes greater success to the lawsuits than most other commentators. Id. at
485.
393. See supra notes 335-37 and accompanying text.
394. See PETER HARRY BROWN & DANIEL G. ABEL, OUTGUNNED 48 (2003) [hereinafter
BROWN & ABEL OUTGUNNED]. Prior to this round of suits, the NRA had viewed itself primarily as a
representative of gun owners, rather than gun manufacturers. Id. at 32.
395. See supra notes 144-45 and accompanying text. Even champions of the gun lawsuits such
as Rostron concede this point. Rostron, supra note 392, at 508.
396. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
397. See Rostron, supra note 392, at 490-93.
398. See, e.g., BROWN & ABEL, OUTGUNNED, supra note 394, at 81-103.
399. See, e.g., BOWLING FOR COLUMBINE (Alliance Atlantis Communications 2002).
400. See Rostron, supra note 392, at 505-06.
401. See supra notes 58 and accompanying text.
402. MASTERS, supra note 149, at 101.
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tion between Merrill's research and banking businesses.4 °3 Also, as dis-
cussed above, similar settlements were reached with ten additional bro-
kerage firms,4 4 essentially implementing these reforms industry wide.
This must certainly be viewed as a success, at least in terms of achieving
the objectives set by the government attorneys prior to initiating the law-
suit. On the other hand, one must question whether these measures have
led to the ultimate consumer protection goals that Spitzer and his col-
leagues pursued. Though Rosenberg does not focus directly on this
point, other critics of the use of litigation to achieve social reform have
pointed out that the "law of unintended consequences" appears to apply
with force to court orders obtained through litigation.4 °5 Thus, even
where the specific measures desired are in fact realized through litiga-
tion, the results flowing from those measures may not be as predicted.
Fordham Law School Professor Jill Fisch argues that this has been the
case with regard to the research analyst settlements. 4° More particularly,
Fisch contends that the economics of providing research information are
such that it is not profitable for brokerage firms to provide this informa-
tion independently from their banking businesses. 40 7 Thus, the result of
the settlements has in fact been a net decrease in the amount of research
analysis available to independent investors.408 Other commentators have
reached similar conclusions. 4°
The Merrill Lynch settlement remains a mixed bag from a cultural
perspective as well. On the one hand, Spitzer seems appropriately to
have raised consciousness that financial services firms are worthy targets
of consumer protection advocates' concern. Prior to initiation of Spitz-
er's actions, few consumer advocates focused much attention on Wall
Street.410 On the other hand, many commentators have raised questions
regarding the impact of Spitzer's actions on principles of federalism, and
correspondingly, the health of the financial markets. As mentioned
above, traditionally, regulation of the securities markets was handled at
411the federal level. Critics have contended that if other state officials
follow Spitzer's lead, the financial services industry will face the crip-
pling prospect of having fifty separate sets of rules to comply with.412
403. See supra notes 199-204 and accompanying text.
404. See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
405. See, e.g., Little, supra note 386, at 1180.
406. Jill E. Fisch, Does Analyst Independence Sell Investors Short?, 55 UCLA L. REv. 39, 39
(2007).
407. Id. at 43.
408. Id. at 39. Fisch points out that the firms have continued to provide adequate levels of
research information to their institutional clients, who are large enough to demand such information.
Id. at 42.
409. See, e.g., MASTERS, supra note 149, at 267.
410. Spitzer's actions seem particularly prescient in light of the economic collapse that effected
Wall Street and the nation in the Fall of 2008.
411. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
412. See MASTERS, supra note 149, at 268-69 (quoting University of Chicago Law Professor
Richard Epstein and American Enterprise Institute Scholar Michael Greve); Christopher R. Lane,
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Some commentators, in turn, have contended that "Spitzerist" interven-
tions in the financial markets do not threaten "balkanization" or the
health of the financial markets. 413 A middle ground position suggests
that Spitzer's actions served a useful purpose in "awakening" the SEC
and other federal regulators to assert their proper, primary enforcement
role with regard to the financial services scandals of the early 2000s.4 14
In any event, though the worst fears regarding "balkanization" appear not
415to have come to pass, it remains to be seen whether "Spitzerism" can
survive the shocking downfall of its namesake.416
C. The Effectiveness of Government Cause Lawyering-Transcending
Limitations
Professor Rosenberg does not rule out entirely the possibility that
litigation might form the basis for progressive social change. However,
he does outline a stringent set of conditions that must be satisfied in or-
der for elite/vanguard cause lawyers to achieve their objectives. First,
there must be adequate support in legal precedent for the change sought
by the reformers.1 7 Second, there must be support for the change from
legislative and executive officials. 4 18 Finally, there must be at least some
citizen support for (or minimal citizen opposition to) the change
sought,419 along with satisfaction of at least one of the following four
conditions: 1) positive incentives offered to induce compliance; 420 2)
costs imposed to induce compliance; 42' 3) court decisions allowing for
market implementation; 422 or 4) non-judicial actors who are willing to
use court orders as a tool for leveraging additional resources or for hiding
behind when such persons decide to act.423
A quick comparison between the cases described above and Rosen-
berg's conditions for elite/vanguard lawyer success suggests that while
Halting the March Toward Preemption: Resolving Conflicts Between State and Federal Securities
Regulators, 39 NEW ENG. L. REV. 317, 339 (2005); Mindy Olson, Note, The Securities Fraud Deter-
rence and Investor Restitution Act: More Effective Than Current Regulation?, 30 J. CORP. L. 425,
441-42 (2005); Steve A. Radom, Note, Balkanization of Securities Regulation: The Case for Feder-
al Preemption, 39 TEX. J. BUS. L. 295, 322-23 (2003); John C. Coffee, Competitive Federalism: The
Rise of the State Attorney General, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 18, 2003, at 5; Michael G. Oxley, Letter to the
Editor, Who Should Police the Financial Markets?, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2002, § 3, at 11.
413. See Jonathon Mathiesen, Survey, Dr. Spitzlove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and
Love "Balkanization," 2006 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 311,313-14 (2006); Tidman, supra note 163, at
399.
414. See Macey, supra note 162, at 957, 973.
415. Tidman, supra note 163, at 398.
416. See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
417. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE, supra note 14, at 31. This argues in favor of incremen-
talism, preferring small and gradual changes over dramatic ones. Id.
418. Id.
419. Id. at 31-32.
420. Id. at 32.
421. Id. at 33.
422. Id.
423. Id. at 33-35.
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the governmental positions of the lawyers initiating the campaigns may
be adequate in themselves to satisfy some of the conditions, nonetheless,
other conditions will remain a challenge to social change oriented litiga-
tion campaigns initiated by government attorneys. For example, with
regard to Rosenberg's second condition, legislative or executive support,
that condition by definition will be satisfied when a government attorney
initiates an elite/vanguard lawsuit. By the same token, it is likely that if a
government lawyer is initiating an action, Rosenberg's third condition, at
least a minimal degree of public support for the action, will be satisfied
as well. After all, given the political nature of the positions of the attor-
neys involved in initiating such suits, it is hard to see them getting so far
"out in front" of public opinion with regard to a particular issue as to fail
to achieve the minimal level of support required by Rosenberg's fourth
condition.
On the other hand, the governmental nature of the plaintiffs will not
necessarily transcend Rosenberg's first condition, at least adequate pre-
cedential support for the change sought. Thus, the Chicago gun suit ul-
timately foundered on the Illinois Supreme Court's unwillingness to ex-
tend the tort of public nuisance to the gun distribution context.424 On the
other hand, the tobacco lawsuit was able to achieve considerable success
with what many commentators described as a questionable legal
theory.425 Both the legitimacy of the Attorneys General who brought the
suits, as well as the ample resources they were able to bring to the litiga-
tion, may well have made up for what was lacking in terms of the doc-
trinal strength of the claims. It is also worth noting that government liti-
gants may have substantive claims available to them which are more
favorable than those that are available to private litigants. For example,
it is quite clear that the relaxed procedural and substantive standards un-
der the Martin Act contributed mightily to the New York Attorney Gen-
eral's success against Merrill Lynch.426
Finally though, Rosenberg's last four conditions often are likely to
be outside the control of the government actors initiating the
elite/vanguard litigation. For example, the State Attorneys General in-
itiating the tobacco lawsuits have not been able to prevent many state
officials from "raiding" the tobacco settlement monies for purposes other
than tobacco control.427 And, market forces may have deprived the re-
search analyst settlements from having their intended effect of improving
the research offerings available to independent investors.428
424. See supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text.
425. E.g., Little, supra note 386, at 1159; but see Rabin, Tobacco Litigation, supra note 30, at
866 ('The second obstacle-finding an effective legal theory-appeared somewhat less formidable by
the early 1980s, in light of the continuing evolution of products liability law.").
426. See supra notes 162-63, 166 and accompanying text.
427. See supra note 378 and accompanying text.
428. See supra notes 405-08 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
The foregoing analysis suggests that each of the government legal
campaigns described above should be considered an example of cause
lawyering. It is true that the government attorneys involved in these
campaigns do not at all times act in the role of cause lawyer, and the
prominent professional status of these lawyers is at odds with the outsid-
er status of most cause lawyers. Nonetheless, the clear social change
objectives that drove these lawyers in their resort to the courts provide an
obvious connection to cause lawyering. Additionally, the very nature of
the public offices held by these lawyers blurs the line between law and
politics in a way that is a hallmark of cause lawyering. Similarly, the
lawyers' obvious personal embrace of the social change objectives of
their actions represents a clear rejection, in the circumstances of each
case, of the profession's non-accountability tenet. Moreover, the lack of
an easily identifiable client in each of the cases led to an inversion of the
typical lawyer-client relationship, in a manner that is consistent with
elite/vanguard cause lawyering.
Despite the factors that distinguish them from prototypical cause
lawyers, the government attorneys involved in the cases discussed here
were not able to transcend entirely the constraints that have traditionally
limited elite/vanguard cause lawyers from achieving the full extent of
their objectives. On the one hand, the high professional status of the
government attorneys involved clearly lent a degree of legitimacy to their
cases that increased their likelihood of success. Additionally, the cases
benefited from the availability of certain legal claims that are only avail-
able to government litigants. On the other hand, each of the cases dem-
onstrated the continuing existence of the above-mentioned traditional
constraints.
For example, in the tobacco case, the full effects of the MSA origi-
nally agreed to by Attorney General Mike Moore were substantially li-
mited by Congress's unwillingness to pass the federal legislation that
would have been needed to implement the MSA in its entirety. And,
Moore has been similarly unable to prevent certain state legislatures from
"raiding" the proceeds of the tobacco settlement for use in balancing
budgets and for additional purposes besides tobacco control. Likewise,
the lawyers in the Chicago City Attorney's office were stymied by the
Illinois Supreme Court's unwillingness to extend the legal doctrine of
public nuisance to the context of gun distribution and sales. Moreover,
the lobbying effectiveness of the NRA and other interests supporting
rural gun owners resulted in legislation at both the state and federal le-
vels that severely set back the objectives of the advocates of gun control.
Finally, market forces have seriously limited the benefits to ordinary
investors intended by New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer's efforts
to ensure research analyst independence in the financial services indus-
try.
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None of this should be read to contend that government attorneys
ought to avoid entirely efforts to use the law and courts to effectuate so-
cial change. To the contrary, at least two of the cases discussed here
were at least partially successful in achieving their objectives. The to-
bacco lawsuit likely did at least contribute to the nationwide decline in
smoking rates that followed the MSA. And, Attorney General Spitzer
did help bring about major reforms within the financial services industry
that served to insulate research analysts from the influence of investment
bankers. And, given the cultural perspective discussed above, it is likely
that all three of the cases influenced legal consciousness and actors in
ways that are difficult to measure but may well result in social change
over the long term. On the other hand, given the limitations mentioned
above, it behooves government attorneys to think carefully about the
means they wish to pursue in seeking to bring about based social change,
and to think hard about the constraints that have historically limited the
effectiveness of elite/vanguard cause lawyering.
